

THE METHODICAL PRINCIPLE IN YOGA ACCORDING TO PATAÑJALI'S YOGA-SŪTRAS.

(The change of quality by quantitative increase.)*)

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Patañjali in his Yoga-sūtras dwells at some length on the first two "limbs" of Yoga (*yogāṅgāni*: *yamāḥ* and *niyamāḥ* II 29–45, II 1sq., and I 23 sqq.)

Their importance for the Yoga-system was admitted by Sigurd Lindquist thus:¹⁾ The importance of *yamas* and *niyamas*, as well as *sīla*, as vital preparatory stages, is evident, among other things, also from the large space devoted to them by Patañjali and his commentators, to say nothing of Buddhist texts, such as the *Samaññaphalasutta* and *Visuddhimagga*.

The preparatory character of *yamas* and *niyamas*, and eventually also of *sīla*, Lindquist compared²⁾ to the prehypnotic suggestion, a thing which he deduced from Vācaspati's commentary on the sūtras II 1, II 26, II 33–34; and the reason for the important place occupied by this ethical section in the doctrines of Yoga seemed to him to lie precisely in that direction. As Lindquist, however, confessed,³⁾ he was unable to throw any light on the problem, where the peculiar peace-giving moment in *yamas*, *niyamas* and *sīla* might be concealed, since this aspect of the discipline clearly remained reserved to *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma* and *pratyāhāra*.

Hermann Jacobi⁴⁾ took the view that *yamas* and *niyamas* had

*) The full Yoga system rests upon eight *aṅgas*, or "limbs", which form a methodical whole. The connection of the first two limbs with the others has hitherto been a point of dispute. One is *yama*, comprising the rules of social ethics, such as „Do not kill, do not steal, do not lie...” and such like, and the other is *niyama*, which lays down regulations for personal behaviour, e. g. cleanliness, study, devotion to God, repetition of the sacred syllable *Om*. An analysis of these two *aṅgas* leads to the unexpected demonstration of not only how methodically these two are marked by the same features as the rest but, incidentally, how by practising each *aṅga* exercise one may bring about changes of quality by quantitative accumulation.

¹⁾ Die Methoden des Yoga, Lund 1932, p. 30.

²⁾ P. 29.

³⁾ P. 27.

⁴⁾ Über das ursprüngliche Yogasystem-Sitzungsberichte der preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, XXVI, 1929.

originally not belonged to Yoga⁵⁾ and from the circumstance of their both being of ethical nature he was inclined to think that the primitive Yoga had never had anything to do with ethics — a thing which went without saying in shammanism, which actually comprised the primitive Yoga. He concluded,⁶⁾ that the precepts (*yamas*) and vows (*niyamas*) had never represented any Yoga practice, though all sorts of magical powers and accomplishments used to be guaranteed to the Yogis as prospective rewards for a thorough observance of the former, as in II 35—45. That was because the Yoga exercises could be performed in the hope of attaining predicted *siddhis*; not so much the observance of *yamas* and *niyamas*; with these the *siddhis* were an unintentional side-result which would come about automatically.⁷⁾

The view taken by Jacobi of *yamas* and *niyamas* is actually identical with that upheld by Lindquist, for, as we have seen, the latter failed to find in them the “peace-giving moment” which had marked off the other “limbs” of Yoga, so that, according to him, too, *yamas* and *niyamas* actually stayed outside the system of Yoga practices.

What remains to be investigated now, is the problem whether *yamas* and *niyamas* belonged only to the primitive Yoga and never rose, as it were, from the status of mere ethical commands and requirements, or whether they, too, contained any characteristics commonly encountered in methodical exercises of Yoga. In other words, it must be shown wherein there is the “peace-giving moment” in *yamas* and *niyamas*, and consequently also the characteristic required from a Yoga exercise.

Patañjali lists eight “limbs” of Yoga:⁸⁾ *yama-niyama-āsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra-dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhayo 'ṣṭāv aṅgāni*. The Maitrī-Upanishad,⁹⁾ however, gives only six limbs, leaving out the first three (*yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*) but adding *tarka*. The same series was also given in the far younger Amṛtabindu.¹⁰⁾

This discrepancy was explained by Jacobi,¹¹⁾ who thought that what was preserved in the Maitrī-Upanishad concerned the primitive Yoga, aiming at the attainment of supernatural powers (*siddhis*) and having nothing in common with ethics, while the systematic Yoga had set up a more elevated target, the summum bonum of Indian philosophy, which had, incidentally, been also in the proud name of “*rājayoga*”, and had imposed upon the Yogi higher ethical and religious requirements, such as

⁵⁾ P. 602.

⁶⁾ P. 604.

⁷⁾ „Ein nicht beabsichtigter Nebenerfolg, der sich automatisch einstellt“.

⁸⁾ II, 29.

⁹⁾ VI, 18.

¹⁰⁾ I, 5—16.

¹¹⁾ L. c., p. 603.

are expressed in *yamas* and *niyamas*. But since the Maitrī-Upanishad leaves out also the third limb, *āsana*, everything that Jacobi said about *yamas* and *niyamas* should apply also to *āsana*, and consequently Jacobi's explanation in this respect leaves much to be desired.

On the other hand, it has been rightly pointed out that *āsana*, as well as *yamas* and *niyamas*, are, in some part at least, contained passim even in the Upanishads, so that the latter actually feature all the elements of the systematic Yoga.¹²⁾ Paul Deussen dismissed the above-mentioned discrepancy by saying¹³⁾ that they "must have been taken for granted as general (both objective and subjective) duties", and as a proof of that he adduced Yogat. 15 and Amṛtabindu 27. *Āsana* was mentioned in the Upanishads in several places.

Hauer¹⁴⁾ saw in Amṛtanāda-bindu-Upanishad a good starting platform for evolving the subsequent *yamas* and *niyamas*, which belonged to the common original tradition of Yoga, Buddhism, and Jainism,¹⁵⁾ contrary to Jacobi's view,¹⁶⁾ that Patañjali was dependent on the doctrine of Jainism.

As pertinent for the clarification of this discrepancy we may adduce the Nyāya-sūtras:¹⁷⁾ *tad-artham yama-niyamābhyām ātma-saṃskāro yogāc cādhyātma-viddhy-upāyaiḥ*.¹⁸⁾ Vātsyāyana in the Nyāyabhāṣya explains *adhyātma-viddhi: sa punas tapaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhyānam dhārane 'ti*. As we see, he enumerates only five limbs of Yoga, leaving out *samādhi* which could not be crowded into the framework of Nyāya thought, while *tapas* belongs to the *niyamas*.¹⁹⁾

The Nyāya-sūtras, however, name *yamaniyama* as if connected together with other *yogāṅgas*, although separately. This, too, is a proof that an older tradition has been relied upon — a view with which also Jacobi concurs. Ruben²⁰⁾ quotes also the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, whose enumeration seems to be older than that in the Yoga-sūtras, for even in the Rāmāyaṇa²¹⁾ *niyama* is mentioned as a meditation on Viṣṇu.

Though this problem, whether *yamas* and *niyamas* belonged to the original Yoga, requires further investigation, we can hold as fairly certain

12) J. W. Hauer: Der Yoga als Heilweg, p. 29.

13) Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie I, 2, p. 346.

14) L. c., p. 34.

15) L. c., p. 57.

16) L. c., p. 604.

17) Text, Übersetzung von Walter Ruben, Leipzig, 1928, p. 127.

18) L. c. IV b 45: for this purpose (i. e. with the view of attaining meditation, true knowledge and redemption) a man arms his soul according to general and special precepts and resources, and doctrine of the soul from the Yogashāstra.

19) Jacobi l. c., p. 602.

20) L. c., p. 218.

21) II, 4.

that they summed up a series of ethical regulations, belonging to a time-honoured and generally accepted Indian tradition.

The second problem-whether *yamas* and *niyamas* were handed down as mere ethical precepts, which did not belong to methodical exercises of Yoga, or whether the characteristics of those exercises make themselves apparent in them-can be promptly solved with the aid of the commentary of the Nyāyabhāṣya to the already cited place,²²⁾ where *ātmasaṃskāra* is explained to mean "evanescence of the *adharma* and increase in the *dharma*", whereby is cleared up also the idea of *pratipakṣabhāvana*,²³⁾ as will be seen from our further deductions.

Our task lies primarily in ascertaining wherein consisted the essence of the first two limbs-*yamas* and *niyamas*-, whether they, too, included Yoga practice like other limbs, and finally, reaching a conclusion, whether or not *yamas* and *niyamas* formed an organic part of the eight-limb Yoga.

Y a m a s a n d n i y a m a s .

P a t a ṅ j a l i defined the practice and purpose of the limbs:¹⁾ *yoga-aṅga-anuṣṭhānād-aśuddhi-kṣaye jñāna-dīptir ā viveka-khyāteḥ* = After the aids to yoga have been followed up, when the impurity has dwindled, there is an enlightenment of perception reaching up to the discriminative discernment.

The point of departure is *aśuddhi-kṣaya* (extirpation of impurity), a means towards the objective is *jñāna-dīpti* (illumination of perception), and the objective is *viveka-khyāti* (discriminative discernment).

These three stages remind us of the division of Yoga into *bahir-aṅgas*, *antar-aṅgas*, and *nirbīja-samādhi*.²⁾ To the *bahir-aṅgas* belonged: *yama-niyama-āsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra*. To the *antar-aṅgas*: *dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhi* (*sabīja*), whose objective was *nirbīja samādhi*. V i j ñ ā n a B h i k ṣ u³⁾ in his commentary cited also the differences between these stages: *Yamādīni caitāni pratyāhārāntāni yogāṅgāni dehaprāṇendriyāṇām nigraharūpāni. Itāḥ param cittanigraharūpaṃ dhāraṇādyāṅgatrayam abhyarhitam vaktavyam* = the constituents of meditation, beginning with restraint (*yama*) and ending with abstraction (*pratyāhāra*), all consist in the controlling of the body, breath and the senses. We ought next to deal with the more important portion of it — the three beginning with steadfastness (*dhāraṇā*) — which consists in the control of the mind.

The differentiating characteristic, as we can see, is stated to be de-

²²⁾ IV b 45.

²³⁾ Y. S. II, 33, 34.

¹⁾ Y. S. II, 28.

²⁾ Y. S. III, 7, 8 and I, 51.

³⁾ Yogasārasaṃgraha p. 43.

haprāṇendriyānām nigrāharūpāṇi and *cittanigrāharūpam*—the controlling of the body, breath and the senses and the control of the mind. Further down,⁴⁾ *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* made equally clear, that *bahir-aṅgas* only tended to the purification of the body, breath and the senses (*dehaprāṇendriyasamskārarūpatvam*), whereas *antar-aṅgas* tended to the purification of the mind (*cittasamskāratvam*). *Antar-aṅgas* were more closely allied to concrete meditation (*samprajñātayogasya*) than the first five *aṅgas*. And even in the absence of the *bahir-aṅgas*, Yoga became possible, provided that they had been accomplished in a previous birth (*prāgbhavīyāḥ*).

The third stage was characterized by *Vyāsa*:⁵⁾ *yogāṅgāny aṣṭāv abhidhāyiṣyamānāni. Teṣāṃ anuṣṭhānāt pañcaparvaṇo viparyayaśūddhirūpasya kṣayo nāśaḥ. Tatkṣaye samyagjñānasyābhivyaktiḥ* = Here are eight limbs of the yoga, which will be enumerated later on. If they are complied with, ceases (i. e. is destroyed) the five-fold *viparyaya* (false knowledge as contrary to *pramāṇa*), whose expression is impurity. On overcoming it, is developing *samyagjñāna* (focused thinking).

Yamas and *niyamas* are here counted with *bahir-aṅgas*, and therefore we are safe in assuming that they should have the same methodical characteristics as *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, and *pratyāhāra*. Without comparing the essential points of the whole of the first set of limbs, we could not discover the possibility of adding the two first limbs (*yamas* and *niyamas*) to, or separating them from, the rest.

One very important circumstance must, of course, be put into the focus of our attention at the very beginning of our investigation. *Patañjali*⁶⁾ made *aśuddhi* an opposite of “*jñāna dīptir ā viveka-khyāteḥ*”, in which progressive illumination manifested itself. As *aśuddhi*-impurity progressively decreases, we see how ever greater illumination is revealed, until discriminative discernment appears. In this sūtra *Patañjali*

⁴⁾ L. c., p. 50.

⁵⁾ To II, 28.

⁶⁾ L. c. II, 28. *Vyāsa* to this sūtra: *Yathā yathā ca sādhanānyanuṣṭhīyante tathā tathā tanutvamaśuddhirūpadyate. Yathā yathā ca kṣīyate tathā tathā kṣayakramānurodhinī jñānasyāpi dīptirvivardhate. Sā khalveṣā vivṛddhiḥ prakarṣamanubhavatyā vivekakhyāteḥ. Ā guṇapuruṣasvarūpaviññānādityarthāḥ. Yogāṅganuṣṭhānamaśuddher viyogakāraṇam. Yathā paraśuśchedyasya. Vivekakhyātestu prāptikāraṇam yathā dharmaḥ sukhasya.* = And in proportion as the means (of attaining discriminative discernment are followed up), so the impurity is reduced to a state of attenuation. And in proportion as it dwindles, the enlightenment of perception also, in accordance with the degree of dwindling, increases. Now this same increase experiences a perfection reaching up to discriminative discernment (or) up to the perfection (II. 26) which distinguishes between the aspects (*guṇa*) as such and the Self. The following up of the aids to yoga is the cause of disconnection (*vīyoga*) with impurity, just as an axe (is the cause of the disjunction of a tree) which is to be cut (from its root). Now (the eight aids) are the cause of attaining discriminative discernment, just as right-living (*dharma*) is (the cause of getting) to happiness.

gave the whole program and procedure for the exercises, the purpose of which was the removal and destruction of impurity and the acquisition of ever greater illumination. We are told here how in each limb both this antithesis and the way for its removal must be included, and this will be a reliable guide-rule in our determining the working procedure applying in each *aṅga*.

To establish this guide-rule, we must once again carry out the analysis of the first two limbs-*aṅgas*: *yamas* and *niyamas*. These are dealt with in the following sūtras: II, 30—45, II, 1 sqq. and I, 23 sqq. *Yamas* and *niyamas* are explained in II, 1 sqq., and *īśvarapraṇidhāna* in I, 23 sqq., though these last two are included already in the sūtras II, 30 and 32. In establishing the method of Yoga, we must take account of all these places, to make the working procedure in the Yoga exercises stand out more clearly.

The sūtras II, 30 and 32 give a list of the individual constituents as numbering five:

II, 30: *ahiṃsā-satya-asteya-brahmacarya-aparigrahā yamāḥ* = non-violence, truthfulness, honesty, continence, non-acceptance of gifts are the abstentions.

II, 32: *śauca-santoṣa-tapaḥ-svādhyāya-īśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ* = cleanliness, contentment, self-castigation, study and devotion to Īśvara are the observances.

The number of the constituents in both limbs grew, so that in Haṭha-yogapradīpikā it rose to ten for each, with further subdivisions; in Buddhism the corresponding disciplines are the *dasa-sīlas* and 10 *sikkhāpadas*.

In *yamas*, there are listed the cardinal virtues; they are the natural ethical precepts. What concerns us here, is the agreement of Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism with P a t a ṅ j a l i. Their mutual relation has frequently been an object of study.⁷⁾

The single commands had a progressive force in them, so that individual precepts developed into very fertile and comprehensive, and even independent movements of the Yoga. This is particularly the case of *ahiṃsā* — the doctrine of non-violence, which evolved into a political instrument and was expounded in the *Ahiṃsā-yoga*.⁸⁾

Besides *ahiṃsā*, particularly *īśvarapraṇidhāna* thrived in Bhaktiyoga. *Tapas*-austerity became a discriminative mark even for political struggle.

Against such multiplicity in *yamas* and *niyamas*, there exists an opposite trend endeavouring to lessen their number and reduce it to a common denominator, which is precisely *ahiṃsā*. J a c o b i⁹⁾ saw in it the influence of Jainism, which had developed all the constituents down to the least

⁷⁾ See Jacobi, l. c., p. 603, Lindquist p. 25 sqq., further Hauer, Beck, de La Vallée Poussin a. o.

⁸⁾ See Śrīman Mohan Gītā or Ahiṃsā-yoga, by Prof. Indra, Lahore 1945.

⁹⁾ See Jacobi, l. c., p. 604.

consequences. Such for instance is the meaning of a place in Yogaśāstra by H e m a c a n d r a,¹⁰⁾ who in II, 31 laid emphasis on *ahiṃsā* as a requirement for the operativeness of the other virtues: *damo devagurūpāstir dānam adhyayanam tapah-sarvam apy etad aphalam hiṃsām cen na parityajet* = Self-control, worship of the gods and *gurus*, generosity, study, austerity, all that is of no avail if we do not give up *hiṃsā*.

V y ā s a¹¹⁾ affirmed the same: the following abstentions are all based upon this non-violence... all the other abstentions are adopted only for the purpose of securing the purity of non-violence. And according to Bhoja *hiṃsā* was *sarvānarthahetuḥ* — the cause of all evils.

The difference between *yamas* and *niyamas* lies in the fact that *yamas* were relating to other persons, being, so to speak, a sort of social regulations, while *niyamas* concerned the Yogi himself. Lindquist was right in pointing out here¹²⁾ that in these two limbs we proceed from the outside inwards, i. e. introvertly.

P a t a ṅ j a l i made yet another distinction between *yamas* and *niyamas*, namely that the former were operative without any limitation by caste, place, time, and circumstance:¹³⁾ *ete jāti-deśa-kāla-samaya-anavachinnāḥ sārvaḥmaṇā mahāvratam* = When they are unqualified by species or place or time or exigency and when (covering) all classes — (under these circumstances exists) the great course-of-conduct. Out of this difference V i j ñ ā n a B h i k ṣ u¹⁴⁾ drew the conclusion, that the characteristic of *yamas* is *nivṛtti*, while that of *niyamas* is *pravṛtti*: *anayor-yama-niyamayormadhye yamānām nivṛtti-mātratayā deśa-kālādyaparicchinnatvasambhūtena tan-nimittikā mahāvratasamjñā sūtrakāreṇoktā. Niyamānām tu pravṛttirūpatayā deśakālādiyantritātvena nāsti mahāvratatvarūpovāntara-viśeṣaḥ iti* = Of the two (abstentions and observances) abstention consisting in mere desisting (*nivṛtti*) from certain actions, is free from the limitations of time and space and as such the author of the sūtras has called it great duty. The observances, on the contrary, consists in engaging (*pravṛtti*) in certain actions, and are, as such, conditioned by time and space; and hence there is no such sub-division of it as great duty.

The differentiation between *nivṛtti* and *pravṛtti* is symptomatic and we shall take up this matter once more as soon as we have investigated the mutual antagonistic tension of the individual constituents in the two limbs. Let us point out at once, however, that according to the Indian way of thinking, a negative quality or virtue, is possessed of the same amount of existence as a positive one. Thus *ahiṃsā* is equally an entity as *hiṃsā*,

10) See ZDMG 1874, vol. 28, pp. 185—262.

11) To II, 30.

12) L. c., p. 25.

13) II, 31.

14) L. c., p. 38.

pravṛtti (advance) and *nivṛtti* (cessation) are equally entities, so that no mere negation of existence, non-entity, is here involved. This is emphasized particularly by *Vijñāna Bhikṣu*. He discerns¹⁵⁾ three states of the thinking principle (*citta*): *pravṛtti*-advance, *nivṛtti*-cessation, and *audā-sīnya*-neutrality, which leave traces in the way of a residuum (*samskāra*). Also *nirodha* (suppression)-the central Yoga notion-leaves traces: *nirodhe-nāpi samskāro janyate*. *Nirodha* does not mean *nāśa* (destruction), nor *abhāva* (non-existence), for *vṛtti* (function) and *vṛttinirodha* (suppression of *citta*) are likewise entities. *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* compares them to walking: *gatipratyāgativat puruṣaprayatnajanaye* = just as the going forward and receding are due to the effort of the agent. Thus *samādhi*, too, is a special positive state of *citta*.¹⁶⁾

In this sense it is that we must judge the "negative" injunctions of *yamas*. To characterize the individual abstentions and observances, we find in the commentaries uncompromisingness, as may be quoted from *Bhoja*:¹⁷⁾ *kañcit kvacit kadācit kasmimścidapyarthe na haniṣyāmi* = I will not kill any one, anywhere, at any time, or for any purpose whatever.

Ahiṃsā consists¹⁸⁾ in freedom from ill-will against all beings at all times and in all ways.

Satya — truthfulness consists in thought and speech being in strict accord with the reality of things. Even truthful speech, if it should lead to an injury of living beings, would not be really truthful, it would be positively sinful... and the speaker would draw upon himself the worst of sufferings. Hence whenever one speaks, he should duly ponder over it and utter only such truth as may lead to the welfare of all living beings.

Asteya — honesty consists in not obtaining things from others in a manner not sanctioned by the scriptures.

Brahmacarya — continence is control of the secret generative organ.

Aparigraha — freedom from avarice means not desiring for one's self means of enjoyment.

Sauca — purification is of two kinds, external and internal: the former is brought about by such means as washing with clay and water etc., and eating purifying things; and the latter consists in discarding the impurities of the *citta*.

Santoṣa — contentment consists in not desiring to obtain anything more than one has already got.

Tapas — austerity consists in the suffering of pairs of opposites, such as hunger-thirst, heat-cold, sitting-standing, stock-stillness and formal stillness.

¹⁵⁾ L. c., p. 3.

¹⁶⁾ See Lindquist, l. c., p. 153.

¹⁷⁾ II, 31.

¹⁸⁾ Vyāsa, II, 30, 32.

Svādhyāya — study consists in the reading of the scriptures dealing with liberation-as also in the repeating of the syllable *Om*.

Devotion to *Īśvara* — *īśvarapranidhāna* consists in the surrendering of all one's acts to the Highest Preceptor.

As for the details, the commentaries adduce also examples, but the centre of interest of these two limbs does not lie in the enumeration and the characteristic of *yamas* and *niyamas*, the reason and the meaning of their inclusion among the eight limbs of the Yoga system being only contained in the subsequent *sūtras*. Already in our characterization of *yamas* and *niyamas* we have been able to point at the antagonistic tension of the individual constituents, such as of *ahiṃsā* — *hiṃsā*, etc., both of which are real states, entities, leaving traces — *saṃskāras*. This antagonistic tension constitutes also the basis for all ethics in its effort to redeem an evil deed by a good one. And this is precisely the discriminative mark we have been looking for in the two limbs — *yamas* and *niyamas*.

P r a t i p a k ṣ a b h ā v a n a .

Patañjali states¹⁾ the methodical procedure, applying in the exercise of *yamas* and *niyamas*, thus: *vitarka-bādhane pratipakṣabhāvanam* = if there be inhibition by perverse-considerations, there should be cultivation of the opposites. *Vitarkā hiṃsādayah, kṛta-kārita-anumoditā, lobha-krodha-moha-pūrvakā, mṛdu-madhyā-adhimātrā, duḥkha-ajñāna-anantaphalā, iti pratipakṣa-bhāvanam* = Since perverse-considerations such as injuries, whether done or caused to be done or approved, whether ensuing upon greed or anger or infatuation, whether mild or moderate or vehement, find their unending consequences in pain and in lack of thinking, there should be the cultivation of their opposites.

By way of introduction to these *sūtras* we should note that the *Nyāyasūtras*²⁾ explain the action of *yamas* and *niyamas* as follows: *yama-niyamābhyām ātmasaṃskārah* = purification of the soul through *yamas* and *niyamas*. The *Nyāyabhāṣya* understands *ātmasaṃskāra* as a cessation of the *adharma* and increase in the *dharma*, which is exactly the explanation of the role of these two limbs according to *Patañjali*.

To this it may likewise be adduced from the *Visuddhimagga*:³⁾ Purification is fulfilled in two ways: by seeing the evils of the depravity of virtue, and by seeing the advantages of the fulfilment of virtue... Thus by retrospective knowledge are to be understood the evils of the depravity of virtue. And the advantages of the fulfilment of virtue should be taken as the opposite of the former... Therefore, seeing the evils of the de-

¹⁾ II, 33, 34.

²⁾ N. S. IV b 45.

³⁾ § 53, 57, 58.

pravity of virtue and the advantages of fulfilment of virtue, one should purify virtue with due respect.

Both these quotations indicate also the substance of *pratipakṣabhāvana*.

Patañjali at first establishes the antithesis of *yamas* and *niyamas* as against *vitarkas*. *Hauer*⁴⁾ classes to these *vitarkas* only *yamas*, as cited in II, 30. *Vyāsa*⁵⁾ joins to this also other sūtras: *evamādi sūtrāntareṣvapi yojyam* = the same should be applied even in other sūtras. A more definite wording is found in *Bhoja*, who extends its operation onto further limbs:⁶⁾ *kāñcit pratipakṣabhūtahiṃsādi vitarkonmūlanadvāreṇa samādherupakurvanti yathā yamaniyamādayaḥ* = Some as abstentions, observances etc., conduce to meditation by means of their eradicating (all) hesitation about things opposed to it, such as killing etc. So *vitarka* is related to these two limbs by its meaning and by right *Bhoja* extends *pratipakṣabhāvana* also upon other limbs, as will be shown later.

The definition of *vitarka* is given⁷⁾ very comprehensively, and *Śrī Tulsīrām Svāmi* in his Hindi commentary⁸⁾ is right in reminding us that *vitark* = *ahiṃsādi ke viruddh tark*, which does justice also to the definition of *tarka* in *Amṛtabindu Upanishad*.⁹⁾

From the *Nyāya-sūtras*¹⁰⁾ the definition of *tarka* is: *avijñāta-tattve 'rthe kāraṇ-opapattitas tattva-jñānārtham ūhas tarkaḥ*.¹¹⁾ The purpose of *tarka* is then reaching directives indispensable to ascertaining questionable things. In this sense II, 34 is a specimen of *tarka*, or rather *vitarka*, i. e. the ascertaining of things that disagree with the doctrine. The aim of *tarka* is to prepare the ground for decision; to this in the *Nyāya* corresponds *nirṇaya*, whose characteristics cause a discrimination of the sūtra II, 33: *vimṛśya pakṣa-pratipakṣābhyām arth-āvadhāraṇam nirṇayaḥ* = the decision is the ascertainment of an object, removing doubt on the ground of a view and counterview. This refers to questionable things, not defined as yet nor clearly recognized (*avijñāta*).

The use of the terms *vitarka*, *pratipakṣa*, and *bādhana*,¹²⁾ and parti-

⁴⁾ L. c., p. 102.

⁵⁾ II, 33.

⁶⁾ II, 29.

⁷⁾ II, 34.

⁸⁾ *Tulsīrām Svāmi: Yog darśan, Merath.*

⁹⁾ A. U., 16: meditation, which is not contrary to the doctrine, is called *tarka* (reflection), while its opposite then is *vitarka*.

¹⁰⁾ I a 40.

¹¹⁾ Reflection is a scrutiny concerning a subject the real nature of which is not recognized, precisely for the purpose of the recognition of its real nature under the aspect whether this or that reason is conclusive.

¹²⁾ N. S. I a 21: *bādhana lakṣaṇam duḥkham* = misfortune has suffering as its specific sign.

cularly the purport of the yoga-sūtras recalls the terms and definitions of the Nyāya-sūtras, and the clarification of the relation of the two schools will require, no doubt, further studies, which, however, are outside the scope of the present paper.

The *vitarkas* are in antithesis to the *yamas* and *niyamas*. B h o j a¹³⁾ gives the following antitheses: *hiṃsā* — *ahiṃsā*, *asatya* — *satya*, *steya* — *asteya*. The complete enumeration of all antitheses is found in Tulsīrām Svāmi:¹⁴⁾

yamas:

ahiṃsā — *hiṃsā*, *satya* — *asatya*, *asteya* — *corī karnā*, *brahmacarya* — *vi-
ṣayalampaṭṭa*, *aparigraha* — *parigraha*;

niyamas:

śauca — *aśauca*, *saṃtoṣa* — *asaṃtoṣa*, *tapa* — *sukumārtā (nazākat)*, *svā-
dhyāya* — *pramāda se ālastā*, *īśvarapranīdhāna* — *nāstiktā*.

The above ten types of the *vitarkas* are further classified both horizontally and vertically, and the commentaries enumerate various combinations produced by this classification. In this manner, V y ā s a¹⁵⁾ was able to state there were 81 combinations of non-violence: *evamekāśī-
tibhedā hiṃsā bhavati* = non-violence has eighty-one forms. It becomes without number when taken with reference to particular restrictions, severally or collectively; for the living beings (to which non-violence can apply) are innumerable. And he adds: *evamanṛtādiṣvapi yojyam* = the same classification may be applied to untruthfulness and other questionable things also.

By this enumeration Patañjali summarized all the possibilities of the *vitarkas*-temptations people are apt to succumb to in their lives, ranging from mere slips to heavy sins or crimes. To become purified, it was necessary to be relieved of all these opportunities for sin, and this was the reason why he stipulated the exercise, which is *pratipakṣabhāvana*, to be performed at each opportunity for sinning. In it lay hidden the remedy, helping us out of the pessimism that might overpower a man reflecting upon the multiplicity of sinful opportunities. In this sūtra, too, he again confirmed the truth:¹⁶⁾ *duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ* = all is pain for the wise man; and here, too, he described the way from pain.¹⁷⁾

P a t a ṇ j a l i found his remedy in an exercise directed from the present into the future, and taught how to bear the past and the present

¹³⁾ II, 30.

¹⁴⁾ To II, 34.

¹⁵⁾ To II, 34.

¹⁶⁾ Y. S., II, 15.

¹⁷⁾ As in Y. S. II, 16: *heyam duḥkham anāgatam* = that which is to be escaped is pain yet to come.

dying away. This future turn was frequently emphasized also by Buddha. Vyāsa aptly adds at this point:¹⁸⁾ *duḥkhamatītamupabhogenātivāhitam na heyapakṣe vartate. Vartamānam ca svakṣane bhogārūḍhamiti na tatkṣa-
nāntare heyatāmāpadyate. Tasmādyadevānāgataṁ duḥkham tadevākṣipātra-
kalpam yoginaṁ kliśnāti netaram pratipattāram. Tadeva heyatāmāpadyate* = Pain past, that is, transferred beyond experience, cannot properly be called a thing to be escaped. And present pain in its own moment (of existence) has attained experience; so it cannot at the next moment be so changed that it can be escaped. Consequently only that pain which is yet to come is that which hinders the yogī only, who is like an eye-ball, but (this does) not (hinder) any other perceiver. Only this pain becomes so changed that it may be escaped.

For *pratipakṣabhāvana* Vyāsa¹⁹⁾ gives a formula to assist concentration, which might already have been stabilized at his time and sounds like a prayer: *Evamunmārgapraṇavītarkajvareṇātidiptena bādhyamānas tat pratipakṣān bhāvayet. Ghoreṣu saṁsārāṅgāreṣu pacyamānena mayā śa-
raṇam upāgataḥ sarvabhūtābhayaḥpradānena yogadharmah. Sa khalvahaṁ
tyaktvā vitarkānpunastānādādānastulyaḥ śvavṛtteneti bhāvayet. Yathā śvā
vāntāvalehī tathā tyaktasya punarādādāna iti. Evamādi sūtrāntareṣvapi
yojyam* = Thus inhibited by the blazing fever of perverse-considerations, let him cultivate the opposites of these. Let him ponder, "Baked upon the pitiless coals of the round-of-rebirths, I take my refuge in the rules for yoga by giving protection to every living creature. I myself after ridding myself of perverse-considerations am betaking myself to them once more, like a dog. As a dog to his vomit, even so I betake myself to that of which I have rid myself". Other similar (inhibitions of perverse-considerations) should be applied in the other sūtras also (upon the aids to yoga)."

Particularly interesting for our purpose is the comparison with the dog, expressing *pratipakṣa* in a rather vulgar but illustrative manner. *Pratipakṣa* works like an inhibition or protection. According to this the essence of *pratipakṣabhāvana* is resistance to wicked thoughts, intentions and temptations, which are being thrown up by such an effort. Like nothing but a dog acts he who repudiates this temptation but yields to it again. It is a comparison that may have belonged to the stock of the ancient illustrative methods of practical education in Yoga, serving to grasp, quickly and correctly, the essence of *pratipakṣabhāvana*.

The sound kernel, however, became covered by a deposit of trite religious formulations, that induced, in the commentaries, the further enlarging of some constituents. This is why Vyāsa develops *pratipakṣabhā-*

¹⁸⁾ To II, 16.

¹⁹⁾ To II, 33.

vana also in another form:²⁰⁾ *Te khalvamī vitarkā dukkhājñānānantaphalā iti pratipakṣabhāvanam. Duḥkhamajñānam cānantam phalam yeṣām iti pratipakṣabhāvanam* . . . Now since these perverse considerations have endless consequences in pain and in lack of thinking, one should cultivate their opposites. (In other words), there is a cultivation of those things the endless consequences of which are pain and a lack of thinking. And to continue, he who commits an injury first of all reduces the strength of the victim, then causes him pain by falling upon him with a knife or something of the kind, (and) afterwards even deprives him of life. When once he has taken away (the victim's) strength, his own animate or inanimate aids begin to have their strength dwindle away. As a result of causing pain, he himself experiences pain in hells and in (the bodies of) animals and departed spirits and in other (forms). As a result of uprooting (the victim) from life, he himself continues from moment to moment at the very point of departure from life. And even while wishing for death he pants laboriously since the fruition is to be felt in a fruition which has a limit (in time). Furthermore, even if (the effects of) injury could be somehow done away by merit, even then, if he obtained happiness, it would be (on condition that) his length-of-life be short. — In the same way, so far as possible, (the classification) is to be applied to lying and to the rest.

And Vyāsa concludes in this words: *Evaṃ vitarkānām cāmumevānugataṃ vipākamaniṣṭam bhāvayanna vitarkeṣu manaḥ praṇidadhīta* . . . = Thus pondering on that same painful consequence of perverse considerations, which is inevitable and undesired, the yogī should never allow his mind to be turned towards these perverse considerations. As a result of the cultivation of the opposites, the perverse considerations become things that may be escaped.

This form of *pratipakṣabhāvana* is derived from the mechanical comprehension of the law of *Karma*, as expressed also in the *Mahābhārata*.²¹⁾ Each *vitarka* automatically has, like *phala*, endless pain and ignorance as its consequence. It is a mechanism of a natural law, which is also the basis of Vyāsa's interpretation. Whenever one falls into temptation but realizes all the consequences that are brought about by the succumbing to this temptation, he refrains from yielding to it.²²⁾ This method corresponds to the ethics of *nivṛtti* as manifested in the philosophical parts of the *Mahābhārata*.²³⁾

²⁰⁾ To II, 34.

²¹⁾ E. g. XII, 279, 20: *yathā karma tathā lābhaḥ*.

²²⁾ This is why Vyāsa says, in II, 33, *tyaktvā*-having abandoned, and *praṇidadhīta*-to be turned (prāṇi+dhā=to direct towards, to turn towards).

²³⁾ Cf. Otto Strauss: *Ethische Probleme aus Mahabharata*. *Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana*, vol. XXIV, 1911, pp. 193—335.

Experience underlying this method is confirmed by modern psychology, for mental analysis decomposes the emotions—in this instance *krodha*, *lobha*—that, like *tṛṣṇā*, express desire for everything which brings endless pain. Decomposition of such emotions removes the principal agent urging to do things.

We have seen how P a t a ṅ j a l i in the *pratipakṣabhāvana* method developed the theory of the wicked deed, *vitarka*, i. e. the deed antithetic to *yamas* and *niyamas*, such as *hiṃsā*, *asatya*, *stea* etc. He traced its realization with all the consequences down to the farthest boundary—endless pain and ignorance. In this manner he could encompass, without any limitations, all wicked deeds and even crime, — however motivated, such as *krodha*, *lobha*, and no matter in what manner performed, such as *kṛta*, *kārita*, *anumodita*, and in whatever degree of intensity, such as *mṛdu*, *madhya*, *adhi-mātra*. This boundary (*anantaphala*), which is marked by *duḥkha* and *ajñāna*, stands in antithesis to the other, opposite boundary, identified by “*jñāna-dīptir ā vivekakhyāteḥ*”.²⁴) A man, about to do something, should first analyze his intended deed prior to reaching any decision, establishing (1) his own responsibility for that deed, no matter whether he prepared to do it himself or induced anybody to do it, or even merely approved of it, (2) emotional motivation, i. e. the reason for which he intended to do it, issuing from greed, anger, delusion and the like, (3) the intensity of its accomplishment, whether it should be slight, moderate, or excessive, and (4) realizing its overwhelming consequences, reflected in pain and ignorance.

In the outcome, this detailed scrutiny of one's action should throw a very sharp light upon all its evil qualities, examine every constituent, and lead, by self-criticism, to true knowledge: this is *pratipakṣabhāvana*.

V y ā s a²⁵) compares very appropriately the antithetic boundaries, *duḥkha ajñānam* and *jñānadīptir ā vivekakhyāteḥ*, with two river streams, *pāpam* and *kalyāṇam*, evil and good virtues: “*Cittanadī nāmobhayatovāhinī yā vahati kalyāṇāya vahati pāpāya ca. Yā tu kaivalyaprāgbhārā vivekaviṣayanimnā sā kalyāṇavahā. Saṃsāraprāgbhārā 'vivekaviṣayanimnā pāpavahā. Tatra vairāgyeṇa viṣayasrotaḥ khilīkriyate. Vivekadarśanābhyāsena vivekasrota udghāṭyate iti ...*” = The so-called river of mind-stuff, whose flow is in both directions, flows towards good and flows toward evil. Now when it is borne onward to isolation, downward towards discrimination, then it is flowing unto good; when it is borne onward to the whirlpool-of-existence, downward towards non-discrimination, then it is flowing unto

²⁴) II, 28.

²⁵) To I, 12.

evil. In these cases the stream towards objects is dammed by passionlessness, and the stream towards discrimination has its flood-gate opened by practice in discriminatory knowledge...

In this connection we may recall once more the characterization of the limbs in the Nyāya-sūtras,²⁶⁾ that the purpose of *yamas* and *niyamas* is *ātmasaṃskāra*, purification of the soul, consisting in decrease and disappearance of *adharma* and increase of *dharma*.

We have pointed out already the practice of *pratipakṣabhāvana* of decomposing, by a rational consideration, emotions marked by a tendency towards the evil, giving up (*tyāgaḥ*), thereby, the way of the evil, and not permitting the mind to tend (*pranīdadhāte*) any more to pain and ignorance.

This reversal of the directional tendency was correctly characterized by S. Dasgupta:²⁷⁾ The contrary tendency consists in the notion that these immoral tendencies (sc. *vitarkas*) cause an infinity of pains and untrue cognition. Pain and un wisdom are the unending fruits of these immoral tendencies and in this idea lies the power which brings the habit of giving a contrary trend to our thoughts.

Bhoja²⁸⁾ confirms that by examining the nature of these *vitarkas* we can get rid of them: "*Teṣāṃ svarūpakāraṇādibhedena jñātānāṃ pratipakṣabhāvanayā yoginā parihāraḥ kartavya iti ...* = the yogi by pondering over the antitheses is to get rid of these (questionable things), which he has understood by means of the division of natures, causes etc."

It is by the result of such scrutiny that Yoga is made easier (*sukaro bhavati*), and thereby the task of *yamas* and *niyamas* is fulfilled. For the *vitarkā himsādayaḥ* are enemies of yogist concentration:²⁹⁾ *Vitarkā yoga-paripanthino himsādayaḥ. Teṣāṃ pratipakṣabhāvane sati yadi bādha bhavati tadā yogassukaro bhavatīti. Bhavatyeva yamaniyamānāṃ yogāṅgatvam* = Killing etc. as opponents of Yoga are things questionable. If these are obstructed when the antitheses are pondered over, then Yoga is facilitated. Hence abstentions and observances really are subservient to Yoga.

In this respect the *pratipakṣabhāvana* method complies with the already mentioned requirements on the limbs:³⁰⁾

- it 1. removes impurity (*aśuddhikṣaye*) and
2. acquires illumination of knowledge (*jñānadīptir ...*).

The *pratipakṣabhāvana* method is being emphasized even nowadays

²⁶⁾ IV b 45.

²⁷⁾ The Study of Patañjali, Calcutta, 1920, p. 147.

²⁸⁾ To II, 34.

²⁹⁾ To II, 33.

³⁰⁾ II, 28.

in a Yogist course published by the Yoga magazine.³¹⁾ For the sake of interest let us quote from it several passages of the instruction, how to perform *yamas* and *niyamas* etc.

"The thinking of the contrary or the contemplation of the opposite of things which appear attractive through ignorance or tempt us in the path of evil, reacts upon the will by tending to generate right estimates of things" (III, 21).

"The *pratipakṣabhāvana* or the negative method of habituation of the contrary, however, has been introduced as one of the safeguards against evil tendencies which obstruct the path of Yoga and not as the only remedy against such obstacles. Its value lies not so much in inspiring virtue as in weakening the potency of repetition of bad thoughts (III, 24—25)."

"In fact, to the eightfold path of Yoga and especially to the last five, psychotherapy has no parallel to offer. But the modern analysts following Ferenczi have confessed the futility of pure reductive analysis and have therefore emphasized permanent modes of regulating the patient's conduct. Here lies the supreme importance of the moral and spiritual code combining the restraints (*yama*) and controls (*niyama*) which is now being widely recognized by modern psychotherapy. It may be pointed out further that the use of contrary production or of meditation on the opposites is not "suggestion" as the analyst may like to believe, but happens to be as much a valid process as "objectification" itself is in psychoanalysis" (V, 2).

In V, 2 another method is described: "Emotional perversions, in the first stage, could be eliminated effectively also by measures other than the above (*pratipakṣabhāvana*). So when jealousy overpowers him, let him think of tolerance; when anger blinds his eyes, let him awaken love; when greed burns his being, let him dwell in contentment; and when passion captivates his heart, let him remember the higher purpose of his living. Every evil temptation could thus be weakened by supplementing the opposite virtue and the same should be followed consciously for such long periods as would establish preponderance of the latter in the subconscious. This is but another negative method of approach."

And we conclude our quotations by a very interesting, though not at all satisfactory passage, saying: "The philosophical system of Dialectical Materialism is the only one which rationally explains Yoga and which

³¹⁾ Yoga-Journal of the Yoga Institute, Editor Shri Yogendra, Bombay, Vol. III, Nos 19—20, 1935: Contemplation on the opposites. No 21: *Pratipakṣabhāvana*. Nos 24—25: Negative methods of emotional control. Vol. IV, Nos 26—28, 1936: Yoga sublimation for the child. Nos 35—37: The Freudian and the Yoga conceptions of repression — an article reproduced from Philosophical Quarterly XIII, 2 by Sharshi Bhusan Das Gupta. Vol. V, No 2, 1950: Yoga in psycho-analysis cum therapy.

will eventually bring it to the mass of people. It is true that many of the people who embrace this philosophy do not know that they are following Yoga. Nevertheless it is true." (V, 2, 1950.)

The *pratipakṣabhāvana* methods were recommended in various degrees of intensity. Let us adduce suitable examples from the *Dhammapadam* 3, 4, 5, 222, 223.³²⁾

The *pratipakṣabhāvana* procedure is known also to the Nyāya philosophy and tends to the removal of defects (*kleśānubandha*), i. e. of attachment, aversion and ignorance. *Pratipakṣabhāvana* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was characterized by Umesha Mishra³³⁾ in the following words: "As regards the presence of defects, it is said that the constant thinking of the contrary of these will naturally make a man free from these. And again, these are not eternal, nor are they products of chance, nor are the means of their destruction unknown. Hence, it is quite easy to get rid of them. Besides, there are so many defects in all these that a man naturally becomes disgusted with the world and is compelled to seek after *Mokṣa*. The constant thinking of the contrary of these defects (*pratipakṣabhāvanā*) is sure to bring freedom from their influences. As for the possible objection that the *Ātman* is never found to be free from the continuous chain of these defects — hence, it is impossible to think that the constant thinking of the contrary of these even will ever bring freedom — it may be pointed out that it is not true; for, everyone of us

³²⁾ *Dhammapadam*:

3. *Akkocchi maṃ, avadhi maṃ, ajini maṃ, ahāsi me,
ye taṃ upanayhanti, veraṃ tesāṃ na sammati.*
4. *Akkocchi maṃ, avadhi maṃ, ajini maṃ, ahāsi me,
ye taṃ na upanayhanti, veraṃ tesūpasammati.*
5. *Na hi verena verāni sammantidha, kuḍācanāṃ,
averena ca sammanti; esa dhammo sanantano.*
222. *Yo ve uppatitaṃ kodhaṃ rathaṃ bhantaṃ va dhāraye,
taṃ ahaṃ sārathim brūmi, rasmiṃgāho itaro jano.*
223. *Akkodhena jine kodhaṃ. Asādhunā sādhanā jine.
jine kadariyaṃ dānena. Saccenālikavādinaṃ.*
3. He abused me, he beat me, he defeated me, he robbed me,
in those who harbour such thoughts hatred will never cease.
4. He abused me, he beat me, he defeated me, he robbed me,
in those who do not harbour such thoughts hatred will cease.
5. For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time,
hatred ceases by love, this is an old rule.
222. He who holds back rising anger like a rolling chariot,
him I call a real driver, other people are but holding the reins.
223. Let a man overcome anger by love, let him overcome evil by good;
let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth.

³³⁾ Umesha Mishra: *Conception of matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, Allahabad, 1936, p. 381.

has got the experience that the *Ātman* is completely free from these defects during the state of *suṣupti*.

If we compare *Patañjali* and *Hemacandra*,³⁴⁾ we arrive at interesting results, from which there may be of some consequence e. g. that to *Patañjali*'s *vitarkaḥ himsādayaḥ* corresponds³⁵⁾ *aticāraḥ vratāni sātīcārāni*, about which *Hemacandra* says: *vratāni sātīcārāni sukr̥tāya bhavanti na. Aticārās tato heyāḥ pañca pañca vrate vrate* = When the vows are accompanied by transgressions, then they are not conducive to well-being. Therefore transgressions should be avoided, of which there are five to each duty.

To *Patañjali*'s *pratipakṣabhāvana* corresponds in another form *pratikriyām cintayet* — for each pernicious defect one should seek a counter-remedy.³⁶⁾

The purpose of *yamas* and *niyamas* is formulated by *Hemacandra* in an analogous manner thus:³⁷⁾ *tad indriyajayam kuryāt manaḥśuddhyā mahāmatih, yaṁ vinā yamaniyamaiḥ kāyākleśo vr̥thā nṛṇām* = Therefore the wise man might by means of purification of his desires (*manas*) conquer his senses. Without this conquest any harassing of the body with *yama* and *niyama* is without avail for the people. According to IV, 40. *manaḥśuddhi* is equal to *dīpikā nirvāṇā*, i. e. consists in obliteration of the will. In IV, 44 *Hemacandra* returns once more to the meaning of *yamas*: *tad avaśyam manaḥśuddheḥ kartavyā siddhim icchatā tapaḥśrutayamaprāyaḥ kim anyaiḥ prāyadaṇḍanaiḥ* = Therefore he, who seeks perfection, should necessarily strive after purity of his desires (*manas*); otherwise what good is there of the conventional wearying oneself with penitence, doctrine, and vows.

In I, 19 he cites also the other manner of *bhāvana*, i. e. the realization of *yamas*: *ahiṁsāsūnṛtāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahāḥ pañcabhiḥ pañcabhir yuktā bhāvanābhir vimuktaye* — *Ahiṁsā* till *aparigraha*, to each of which there belong five ways of manifestation (*bhāvanā*), lead to salvation.

To *Patañjali*'s *krodha, lobha, moha* correspond the same terms in IV, 81, which are suppressed by *kṣamayā, ṛjutenā, anīhayā: kṣamayā mṛdubhāvena, ṛjutenā'py anīhayā-krodham mēnam tathā māyām lobham rundhyāt yathākramam* = By patience, by modesty, by uprightness, by contentedness let us suppress in the same order: wrath, pride, deception, greed.

Hemacandra may serve us as a proof in our argument that

³⁴⁾ ZDMG 1874, Bd 28, pp. 185—262, Ernst Windisch: Hemacandra's Yogaśāstra. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Jaina-Lehre — with the text and a translation.

³⁵⁾ In III, 88.

³⁶⁾ In Hemacandra III, 135: *yo yaḥ syād bādhako doṣas, tasya tasya pratikriyām cintayed doṣamukteṣu...*

³⁷⁾ In IV, 34.

P a t a ṇ j a l i's formulation has a wider application, though we shall not engage in further comparison of these two authors.

B h ā v a n a.

In order to throw more light on the *pratipakṣabhāvana* method, we must also gain a clear understanding of the meaning of *bhāvana*. It plays an important role in the attaining of some *siddhis*.¹⁾ Then only can we decide whether they imply a mere unintentional side-success which comes about automatically, or something else.²⁾

It is very interesting to note that P a t a ṇ j a l i used the term *bhāvana* for *yamas* and *niyamas* or their constituents. Besides *pratipakṣabhāvana* in II, 23 he used the same expression in I, 28 when explaining *īśvarapraṇidhānam*, which is a constituent part of *niyamas*, and in II, 2 in the discourse about *Kriyāyoga*, which likewise belongs to *niyamas*.

Still more interesting is the way of interpreting *bhāvana* in the commentaries. B h o j a³⁾ gives a definition of *bhāvana* thus: *Bhāvanā tāvad. Bhāvyasya viṣayāntaraparihāreṇa cetasi punaḥpunarniveśanam* = *Bhāvanā* means the entrance of an object (*bhāvya*) into the mind again and again, with the exclusion of all the other objects.⁴⁾

Identically defines *bhāvana* V ā c a s p a t i M i ś r a:⁵⁾ *bhāvanam punaścitte niveśanam*. V y ā s a⁶⁾ quotes Viṣṇu Purāṇa: *svādhyāyādyogamāsīta, yogātsvādhyāyamāsate, svādhyāyayogasampattiyā paramātmā prakāśate* = After *svādhyāya* one should have recourse to meditation, and after meditation he should again take to repetition (*svādhyāya*); through perfection of repetition and meditation the supreme spirit becomes manifested. Also by this quotation V y ā s a expressed what we know already as *punaḥpunaścitte niveśanam*, which is intensified further to *sampatti* (perfection, excellence). We shall have opportunity to speak of this gradation again later on.

Now what is interesting here is precisely the fact that both B h o j a and V ā c a s p a t i M i ś r a give *bhāvana* identically as *abhyāsa* — a practice, which together with *vairāgya* (dispassion) is an aid to inhibiting the *vṛtti* = *nirodha* (I, 12). *Abhyāsa* consists in an effort towards calmness.⁷⁾ In his explanation V y ā s a used the term: *tatsādhanānuṣṭhā-*

¹⁾ As cited in Y. S. II, 35—45.

²⁾ Jacobi, l. c., p. 604.

³⁾ To I, 17.

⁴⁾ Bhoja's definition of *bhāvanam* in I, 28 is identical: *punaḥ punaścetasi niveśanam*. *Bhāvanam* is a means for concentration (*ekāgratāyā upāyaḥ*), and one of its kinds is *samprajñātaḥ samādhiḥ* (to I, 17).

⁵⁾ To I, 28.

⁶⁾ To I, 28.

⁷⁾ I, 13: *tatra sthitau yatnobhyāsaḥ*.

namabhyāsaḥ — and it is one's having recourse to this means of accomplishing it which constitutes practice. Vācaspati Miśra adds to it: *sthitisāadhanānyantaraṅgabahirāṅgāṇi yamanīyamādini* = hence the means are abstentions etc. — the same as described in II, 29 sqq.

There is no wonder therefore that both Bhoja and Vācaspati give the definition of *abhyāsa* identical with that of *bhāvana*. According to Bhoja,⁸⁾ *abhyāsa* is: *abhyāsaścetasah punahpunarniveśanam*, and according to Vācaspati Miśra:⁹⁾ *abhyāsastadanuṣṭhānam punaḥ punyam* = The practice of it is the repeated pursuit of this exercise with frequent or constant repetition. It is clear now that the commentators used *abhyāsa* in the original meaning of: repetition in general, repeated or continued practice or exercise, which precisely expresses the effort of the mind to remain in its unchanged state of purity.

Further analysis of this effort (*yatna*) will lead us to very important consequences, for by constant bringing into the mind (*niveśana*) the effort (*yatna*) undergoes a gradation, until perfection (*sampatti*) is reached, or stability of mind (*sthairya*)¹⁰⁾ which quite corresponds to Patañjali's expression *pratiṣṭhā*,¹¹⁾ and through it, then, even certain *siddhis* are attained. Then we shall learn whether these *siddhis* are attained with *yamas* and *niyamas* as unintentional and automatic side-success ("unbeabsichtigter, automatischer Nebenerfolg"), as Jacobi asserted, or whether the same process is involved as with the subsequent *aṅgas*. Before going into the comparison of the methodical procedure, given for the first two *aṅgas*, with that given for the rest, it is necessary further to analyze the methodical process by which the *siddhis* are attained through the exercise of *yamas* and *niyamas*.

The change of quality by quantitative increase.

We stand before the most interesting part of the Yoga method, which shows how to change quality by quantitative increase. Having in mind the results arrived at before, i. e. that *bhāvana* and *abhyāsa* should be understood as constantly repeated exercises with a gradation of the effort until perfection is reached, we must examine also the term "*saṃvega*", which is used to express this increasing intensity.

Bhāvana, identically with *abhyāsa*, is given as constant entering the mind; in other words it implies a constantly repeated effort (*yatna*) aiming at the reaching of the supreme appointed objective. In the first two *aṅgas* it is stretched between two opposite poles: there is *vitarka*

⁸⁾ To I, 32.

⁹⁾ To I, 18. To I, 28: *Bhāvanam punaḥ punaścitta niveśanam*.

¹⁰⁾ Vyāsa to III, 39.

¹¹⁾ Fixity, firm foundation: *prati+sthā*= to stand firmly, in II, 35 sqq.

as *himsā* etc., with all the consequences of pain and ignorance on the one hand, and *pratiṣṭhā* (firm foundation, P a t a ṇ j a l i), *sampatti* (perfection, V y ā s a), or *sthairya* (firmness of mind) on the other. These are the two currents mentioned by the commentaries on the cited place. Their movement is of opposite character — one is extrovert, tending towards *saṃsāra* (the world), the other is introvert. The purpose of the aṅgas is the weakening, or even destroying, of the extrovert current and the reinforcing of the introvert, as related in unison by the commentaries.¹⁾ There are two elements causing the weakening of the former and the intensification of the latter: *vairāgya* (dispassion) and *abhyāsa* (exercise, practice) — one of emotional and the other of energetical character. The operation of these elements is characterized best by V y ā s a:²⁾ *tatra vairāgyeṇa viṣayasrotaḥ khilīkriyate. Vivekadarśanābhyāsenā vivekasrota udghāṭyata iti* = dispassion serves to attenuate the flow through worldly objects and the practice of discrimination serves to enliven the flow through discriminative knowledge.

It is a moot point if both of these elements — dispassion and exercise — are contained also in *pratipakṣabhāvana*. In P a t a ṇ j a l i³⁾ the emotional element in *vitarka* is expressed by two words: *lobhakrodhamohapūrvakā*, which amounts to saying that this emotional element, coupled with the intellectual (*moha*) one, is the cause whose effect are *duḥkḥājñānānantaphalā*. This was made plain particularly in Buddhism in the four truths. The energetical element is contained in the formulation *mṛdumadhyādhimātrā*, stipulating also the gradation in three stages.

The emotional element becomes decomposed by systematical deliberation (*bhāvana*), meditation and other remedies; in other words, we think twice before committing a wicked deed which in this manner becomes neutralized, and consequently is not going to be committed. The exercise (*abhyāsa*, *bhāvana*, or *punaḥpunaṣṇiveśanam*) tends to perpetuate this deliberation, revives it, strengthens it, reinforces it.

If *vitarka* does not become real in the shape of *himsā*, etc., it means that we have reached *ahimsā*. By constant decomposition of all sorts of *vitarkas* the extent in which *yamas* and *niyamas* are attained increases until the stage of *drḍham sthairyam*⁴⁾ is reached, which is P a t a ṇ j a l i's *pratiṣṭhā* or *sthairya*. The signs of having reached this stage are *siddhis*.⁵⁾

We must find support for such interpretation in the evidence from the sūtras and commentaries. Let us take up consecutively first the emotional and then the energetical element and their gradation up to the

¹⁾ To I, 12.

²⁾ To I, 12.

³⁾ II, 34.

⁴⁾ Bhoja, to I, 12.

⁵⁾ Vyāsa, to I, 35.

appointed goal, and, of course, how these elements manifest themselves in *yamas* and *niyamas*.

P a t a ṅ j a l i⁶⁾ chose dialectical antithesis as the practice conducting to the attainment of *yamas* and *niyamas*. *Yamas* and *niyamas* are *pakṣas* whose *vitarkas* are constituted as *pratipakṣas*. B h o j a⁷⁾ gave this antithesis quite clearly and listed the *yamas* with their *pratipakṣas*: *ahimsā* — *himsā*, etc. These antithetic constituents of *yamas* and *vitarkas* are real states, they exist, no negative relation to non-existence is implied. *Himsā* with *ahimsā*, and so on, are couples of entities.

On the methodical side, there were two ways open for P a t a ṅ j a l i:

1. He might have insisted on the commands (abstentions and observances), and in that case J a c o b i would have been right in denying that *yamas* and *niyamas* are practices of Yoga, or,

2. He might prescribe a positive method how to attain *ahimsā*, etc., whereby he would have stepped into the domain of religion; and it deserves some interest that this method was used⁸⁾ as *maitrī karuṇā muditā upekṣā* in close connection with *īśvarapraṇidhāna* and that it was particularly developed in Buddhism. P a t a ṅ j a l i, however, favoured the negative method, that of concentration in *pratipakṣa* to *yamas* and *niyamas*, starting from the assumption that the man, even a righteous one, sins at all times, and therefore everything is suffering for a man qualified to discriminate accurately.⁹⁾ He was intent on removing this future suffering, — not the past and present one, which becomes manifest or will become manifest by force of the law of *Karma* — and to its obliteration he offered a choice of other methods in further practices. He wished to remove the causes of suffering yet to come;¹⁰⁾ and for this purpose the *pratipakṣabhāvana* method seemed to him the best instrument, teaching the art of analysis, decomposition into causes (*pūrvakā*) and effects (*anantaphala*), paying heed to intensity and encompassing all possible forms appearing in their full richness in the human life. He indicated the extent of the practices by *kṛta-kārita-anumoditā*, no matter whether I do something by myself, or give the order, or my consent. And in II, 31 he stated the inflexibility and uncompromisingness of *yamas*, their validity in respect to everybody, everywhere, at any time and under any circumstances.

Whenever *pratipakṣabhāvana* is being referred to,¹¹⁾ we find that the elements *vairāgya* (*vi-rāga*, dispassion) and *abhyāsa* (practice) are

⁶⁾ II, 33.

⁷⁾ To II, 33.

⁸⁾ In I, 33.

⁹⁾ As he says in II, 15: *duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ*.

¹⁰⁾ II, 16: *Heyaṃ duḥkham anāgatam*—what is to be shunned is pain not yet come.

¹¹⁾ II, 34.

not marked in any way, yet they are quite clearly differentiated as *lobha-krodhamohapūrvakā* and *mṛdumadhyādhimātrā*. This led the commentaries to distinguish three grades of those who cultivate Yoga, assigning minor rank to Kriyāyoga and *bahiraṅgas*, while *vairāgya* and *abhyāsa* became the remedy for the advanced rank (*yogārūḍha*).¹²⁾ Here we overlook the controversy as to the entirety of Patañjali's Yoga-sūtras, although some conclusions may be reached even from the present discussion; we leave that for another occasion.

Both Vyāsa's and Bhōja's viewpoint induced them to classification, so that by combination¹³⁾ they arrived at 81 forms of each constituent of *yamas* and *niyamas* and their possible combinations out of number. Bhōja argued, against Patañjali, that the cause of *vitarkas* was *moha* (*mohapūrvikā*), though Patañjali listed in the first place *lobha* and *krodha*, since *moha* — *avidyā* was the source of all the *kleśas* — afflictions.¹⁴⁾ Here Bhōja was right in noticing the difference between the description of *kleśas* in II, 3 and that in II, 34. Yet the fact that in the formulation given in II, 34, *lobha* and *krodha* (both so characteristic emotional constituents) filled the first place, testifies in favour of the theory that in II, 34 emotivity is primary concern; as Bhōja himself rightly pointed out, *lobha* = *trṣṇā* (thirst), and *krodha* = *prajvalanātma-kaścittadharmaḥ kṛtyākṛtyavivekonmūlakah* = anger is an inflamed condition of the mind, which uproots all discrimination between what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. And against Bhōja, who made *moha* and *avidyā* identical as *anātmanyātma* (the not-self as the self),¹⁵⁾ there was Vyāsa¹⁶⁾ with more suitable practical examples: *lobhena māṃsacarmārthena*, *krodhenāpakṛtamaneneti*, *mohena dharmo me bhaviṣyatīti* = (each of these is of three kinds according as it is due) to greed for the purpose of securing the flesh or skin (of the animal killed), or to anger prompted by the idea "this man has injured me", or to delusion prompted by the idea that (by killing the animal) "I shall be acquiring merit". Here Vyāsa is correct in realizing that in II, 34 in the first place the emphasis belongs to emotion.

The purpose of *bhāvana* is to uproot this negative emotional constituent by analysis, meditation, intellectual activity; the same standpoint is maintained also by modern psychology.

If we are to look for the energetical element in *pratipakṣabhāvana*, we find it in the expression:¹⁷⁾ *mṛdumadhyādhimātrā* (mild or slight — inter-

¹²⁾ Vijñāna Bhikṣu: Yogasārasaṃgraha p. 22.

¹³⁾ To II, 34.

¹⁴⁾ II, 3, 4.

¹⁵⁾ To II, 3 and 34.

¹⁶⁾ To II, 34.

¹⁷⁾ In II, 34.

mediate — beyond measure). The same term appears in I, 22: *mṛdu-madhyādhimātratvāttato'pi viśeṣaḥ* = there is a further differentiation through the mild, intermediate and vast (beyond measure) nature. The commentators¹⁸⁾ again used this as an opportunity to investigate all possible combinations, and reached nine, corresponding also to the nine kinds of Yogis.¹⁹⁾

The division referred to concerns *saṁvega*:²⁰⁾ *tīvrasaṁvegānāmāśanaḥ* = (this attainment of this state of *saṁādhi* is) speedy in the case of the hotly impetuous. The commentators' interpretations of this term disagree; some, as for instance Vācaspati Miśra, say that it is identical with *vairāgya*, others make a discrimination.

Vācaspati Miśra²¹⁾ has *saṁvega* identical with dispassion. Bhoja²²⁾ explains *saṁvega* as an energetical element: *saṁvegāḥ kriyāheturdr̥ghatarassaṁskāraḥ* = by impetuosity is meant a more energetic, self-reproducing impulse, which is the cause of action. Vijñāna Bhikṣu²³⁾ characterizes *saṁvega* as *śīghra* and *tīvra* = quick, rapid — intense, impetuous, hot: *Teṣāṁ copāyānāmatisīghratīvratarānuṣṭhanād āsanataro ...* = when these means (i. e. *śraddhā*, etc.) are employed with great impetuousness and intensity ..., and subsequently quite distinctly puts *saṁvega* in antithesis with *māṁdya* (laziness, weakness, sluggishness): *upāyānuṣṭhānamāṁdye'pi* = even when there is sluggishness in the employment of these means.

This incongruity is characteristic, for Patañjali²⁴⁾ gives, as the sign for *vairāgya*, *vitṛṣṇā* — free from thirst, which means that its antithesis is *tr̥ṣṇā*, or *lobha* (identified by Bhoja with *tr̥ṣṇā*). Now this lends support for the explanation of II, 34, that *lobhakrodhamoha* are antitheses to *vairāgya*, *vitṛṣṇā*, and that emotive directional tendencies are implied. Again we may in this sense lay stress on the correctness of Vyāsa's interpretation,²⁵⁾ that dispassion serves to attenuate the flow and practice serves to enliven the flow. Practice is stored energy which sets the direction for the emotive tendency. *Rāga*, *tr̥ṣṇā*, *lobha*, *krodha* tend towards *saṁsāra*; *virāga* (*vairāgya*), *vitṛṣṇā* have an opposite direction. This directional current is intensified by energy in the grades: *mṛdu-mādhyādhimātra*; both its speed (*śīghra*) and intensity are set.

¹⁸⁾ I, 20, 21, 22.

¹⁹⁾ Both Bhoja and Vyāsa to I, 22, ex. 21: *tadbhedenaca nava yogino bhavanti* = and in accordance with this division we arrive at nine classes of the followers of Yoga.

²⁰⁾ This term is used in the preceding sūtra, I, 21.

²¹⁾ To I, 21: *saṁvego vairāgyam*.

²²⁾ To I, 21.

²³⁾ Yogasārasaṁgraha, p. 18.

²⁴⁾ I, 15.

²⁵⁾ To I, 12.

Therefore Das Gupta²⁶⁾ is right in saying that *saṁvega* means quickness in the performance of the means of attaining yoga... The word *saṁvega* etymologically does not mean *vairāgya* either.

From what we have said it is evident that in *pratipakṣabhāvana* two elements, emotive and energetical, are differentiated and that the latter can intensify *bhāvana*. Vācaspātī Miśra did intensify *bhāvana* but overlooked the differentiation based on emotion and intensity. *Lobha*, *krodha* and *trṣṇā* are graded according to intensity, and equally so their antithesis *vitṛṣṇā*, which is a sign for *vairāgya*.

What interests us most, however, in this matter, is precisely this ladder-like sequence *mṛdu-madhyā-adhimātra*. It is manifest both in *vitarkas* in the way of *himsā*, etc. and in their antitheses (*ahimsā*, etc.). The direction for these antitheses is set by the emotional element, characterized likewise by doubleness of direction. One of the directions is known to us as *lobha-krodha-moha*, the other is indicated by the words *vairāgya*, *apara* and *para*.²⁷⁾ The energetical element (*mṛdu*, *madhyā*, *adhimātra*) gets firmer and stronger, and for this reinforcement there is in Patañjali the word *pratiṣṭhā* — fixity, strength²⁸⁾ and *sthairya* — firmness, steadiness;²⁹⁾ with Bhoja it is also *prakarṣa* — excellence, intensity, high degree, strength, power³⁰⁾ (in II, 36: *satyam prakṛṣyate yathā* — the truthfulness rises to such a degree that...; see Vyāsa II, 38: *utkarṣayati*), and also *phala*.³¹⁾

When intensity reaches a certain degree — *pratiṣṭhā*, *sthairya* — signs of success (*siddhis*) begin to appear. If *vitarkas* are unproductive or abandoned,³²⁾ mastered or controlled,³³⁾ the appearance of *siddhis* marks success.³⁴⁾ It may be added that Vācaspātī Miśra³⁵⁾ actually used, in explaining this, the word *cihnam* — mark, sign, indication.

For *yamas* we find the following *siddhis* enumerated:

To *ahimsā* there is³⁶⁾ *vairatyāga* — suspension of enmity near the yogi.

To *satya*,³⁷⁾ *kriyāphalāśrayatva* — receptacle of the fruits of work.

To *asteya*,³⁸⁾ *sarvaratnopasthāna* — all jewels come near him.

²⁶⁾ The Study of Patanjali, p. 133.

²⁷⁾ I, 15 and 16.

²⁸⁾ II, 35—38.

²⁹⁾ II, 39.

³⁰⁾ To II, 35, 37, 38, 42, 43, 44.

³¹⁾ II, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45.

³²⁾ Bhoja, to II, 35: *parihāraḥ*.

³³⁾ Vyāsa, to II, 35: *aśvāryam*.

³⁴⁾ Vyāsa, to II, 35: *tatkṛtameśvāryam yoginaḥ siddhisūcakam bhavati*.

³⁵⁾ II, 35.

³⁶⁾ II, 35, 36.

³⁷⁾ II, 36.

³⁸⁾ II, 37.

To *brahmacarya*,³⁹⁾ *vīryalābha* — vigour, strength.

To *aparigraha*,⁴⁰⁾ *janmakathamtāsambodha* — knowledge of the how and wherefore of his birth.

For *niyamas* the following *siddhis* are listed :

To *śauca*,⁴¹⁾ *svāṅgajugupsā parairasaṃsargaḥ* — disgust for one's own body and non-contact with others. That is the result of external cleanliness. With *śauca* II, 41 these attained *siddhis* are promised as a result of internal cleanliness: *sattvaśuddhisaukṣmanasyaikāgratendriyajay-ātmadarśanayogyatvāni* — mental purity, complacency (or clarity according to Vācaspati), one-pointedness, subjugation of the senses and capacity to perceive the self.

To *saṃtoṣa*,⁴²⁾ *anuttamah-sukhalābhaḥ* — superlative felicity.

To *tapas*,⁴³⁾ *kūyendriyasiddhiraśuddhikṣayāt* — the perfection (*siddhi*) of the body and the senses by the removal of impurity.

To *svādhyāya*,⁴⁴⁾ *iṣṭadevatāsaṃprayogaḥ* — union with the chosen deity.

To *īśvarapranidhāna*,⁴⁵⁾ *saṃādhisiddhiḥ* — the perfection of communion.

When we make a comparison of the results predicted for consistent exercise of *yamas* and *niyamas* with the commentaries, we become aware that while the latter feature the experiences and events of these higher qualities, they display also their social indication.

Thus e. g. the man enjoying the higher degree of *ahimsā* disarms all enemies, including beasts such as the snake and the mongoose, which, when near him, abandon their enmity and abide in amity. With a positive social indication are the new qualities arisen from *ahimsā*, *satya*, *asteya*, *aparigraha*; whilst negatively indicated is *śauca* in II, 40 (positively, *śauca* in II, 41), *saṃtoṣa*, *tapas*, *svādhyāya*, *īśvarapranidhāna*.

We cannot, however, pursue this problem of social indication to all its surprising implications, since our main theme leads us in a different direction, that is towards the question, how the change of quality manifests itself and in what it consists. The evidence contained in some commentaries is very remarkable and fully bears out everything we said in the foregoing. Particularly persuasive is the passage from B h o j a,⁴⁶⁾ in which he explains once more the sequence of the emotive constituent *rāga* — desire in the extrovert direction and of its antithesis in the introvert direction. He

³⁹⁾ II, 38.

⁴⁰⁾ II, 39.

⁴¹⁾ II, 40.

⁴²⁾ II, 42.

⁴³⁾ II, 43.

⁴⁴⁾ II, 44.

⁴⁵⁾ II, 45.

⁴⁶⁾ To II, 39.

says that *āparigraha* (freedom from avarice, non-covetousness) refers also to the body, and likewise *parigraha*. He then adds:

Bhogasāadhanatvāccharīrasya tasmin sati rāgānubandhādbahirmukhāyāmeva pravṛttau na tāttvikajñānaprādurbhāvaḥ. Yadā punaḥ śarīrādiparigrahanairapekṣyeṇa mādhyasthamaṇḍalambate tadā madhyasthasya rāgādityāgātsamyagjñānaheturbhavatyeva pūrvāparajanmasambodhaḥ — Since a body is an instrument of enjoyment whilst it exists, from its association with desires, our energy being directed to the external, no real knowledge reveals itself. When again, without regard to coveting a body etc., one betakes one's self to indifference, then, since one abandons desire etc., the acquaintance with the past and future states of existence becomes indeed a cause of right knowledge to the indifferent.

Hence it is clear to him — and thereby he confirms our own results — that the emotive constituent *rāga* is directed (*pravṛtti*) to the outside (*bahir*) towards *ajñāna*. Its counter-current, which is *rāgādityāga* (i. e. *nivṛtti*) leads to *madhyastha* (indifference) and *jñāna* (knowledge), and ultimately to *siddhis*. That is the same thing as we find in the commentary⁴⁷⁾ about *tapas*, where on the removal of the *cittakleśas* (afflictions of the mind) a new power (*sāmarthyam*) makes its appearance (*āvirbhavati*). Finally, the directional tendency is made evident in B h o j a's use⁴⁸⁾ of the words *iṣṭa-abhipreta* = wished, intended.

V y ā s a, too, described counter-active emotion by desiderative expression *jijñāṣā*⁴⁹⁾ — the thirst for knowing, *trṣṇā-kṣaya*⁵⁰⁾ — suppression of desires, and *tadāvaraṇamalāpagamāt*⁵¹⁾ — from the disappearance of obscuring impurities (*apagamaḥ* = going away, going off), which corroborates the accuracy of our analysis.

A very interesting instance of intensification of quality is contained in the comment to II, 41. It is a place on which V y ā s a and B h o j a are in accordance. Speaking about *kramena prādurbhavanti* (the mind-purity etc.), B h o j a employs the phrase that they “manifest themselves in succession”, so that new qualities are acquired one after another: *śaucāt sattvaśuddhiḥ-sattvaśuddheḥ saumanasyam*, etc. “*Kramena*” (in succession) indicates the manner of the acquiring of new qualities, either by the practice of *bhāvana*, or *abhyāsa*, consequently by quantitative increase.

To confirm the correctness of our analysis let us cite yet the commentaries to II, 26. This is the sūtra indicating the path to liberation — *mokṣasya mārga*. According to V y ā s a this path runs through the following stages:

⁴⁷⁾ To II, 43.

⁴⁸⁾ In II, 44.

⁴⁹⁾ To II, 39.

⁵⁰⁾ To II, 42.

⁵¹⁾ To II, 43.

(1) The discernment of the distinction between the *puruṣa* and *sattva* (*prakṛti*) oscillates (*plavate*) until all misconception (*mithyajñāna*) has entirely ceased,

(2) But when misconception has its sprouting power completely scorched (*dagdhabījabhāva*) and its productivity has stopped (*bandhyaprasava*),

(3) Then the person shakes off the impurities of afflictions (*kleśas*) and comes to occupy the highest point of effulgence and becomes firm in the *vaśīkārasamjñā*,

(4) So that the flow of discriminative knowledge (*vivekapratyayapra-vāha*) becomes clear. And it is the unflinching, steadfast, discriminative knowledge which is the means of quitting (the state of bondage). By this means misconception is deprived of its sprouting power, hence there are no more products of misconception (in the shape of afflictions and pain).

B h o j a's explanation of this path to liberation rests on the force of *pratipakṣabhāvana*: *Pratipakṣabhāvanābalāda vidyāpravilāye* ... = when ignorance (*avidyā*) is dissolved by force of meditating on what is opposed to it ... and the conceit of being knower or agent has been laid aside, and when it is unoppressed by the filth of passion and darkness (*rajas tamas*), then that which comes about is discriminative knowledge.

B h o j a employed the same explanation also in other analogous cases, such as for instance when discoursing on *avidyā*, on which there will be more later on.

Interim Review of Results.

The result of our above investigation is our having established *pratipakṣabhāvana* as the practice of *yamas* and *niyamas* effective for reaching *siddhis* (new qualities) by quantitative increase. Let us, after a summary of these results, proceed to an examination of the practices of the further *aṅgas*, in order to find whether the practice applying in *yamas* and *niyamas* corresponds to the practices of other *aṅgas*; at the same time, whether the outcome of the first two *aṅgas*, the *siddhis*, represent new qualities, as is definitely the case with other *aṅgas*.

Thus far, we have been able to ascertain that both P a t a ṅ j a l i in his Yoga-sūtras and his commentators put *yamas* and *niyamas* in a relation of antithesis against *vitarkas* — e. g., *ahiṃsā* against *hiṃsā*, etc. By dint of that is attained great tenseness, caused precisely by oppression, annoyance (*bādhana*) of *vitarkas*. In this tenseness the emotive directional tendency (*lobha*, *krodha*, *moha*) — the intellectual and the energetical three-grade intensity (*mṛdu-madhya-adhimātra*), prevail. The doings of the man are determined by these tendencies. The emotive tendency passes through *lobha*, *krodha*, *moha* (the intellectual phase) onto the opposite

pole, denoted by *vivekakhyaṭi*, accompanied by *vairāgya* (*para-*, *apara-*). The two poles are characterized by *duḥkha*, *ajñāna-anantaphala* on one side, and *jñāna* down to *vivekakhyaṭi* on the other. In this division the third (intellectual) constituent is reflected, whose analysis is the scope of *Kriyāyoga*, as we shall see later (*moha*, *ajñāna-jñāna*).

The purpose of the Yoga practices is to weaken or even destroy impurity (*asuddhikṣaya*) and attain introversion, by the reversal from the pole of *lobha* etc., *duḥkha*, *ajñāna*. This reversal is expressed by the counter-direction (*pratiprasava*).

In this scheme the first two *aṅgas* (*yamas* and *niyamas*) have the role of bringing about this reversal of the directional tendency. The means towards complying with this task is the *pratipakṣabhāvana* practice, i. e. to attain the greatest tenseness by unrelaxing decomposition of *vitarkas* (*himsā* etc.) into their emotive constituents and, by enhancing this analysis according to the energetical intensity, decompose by means of such analysis the emotive tendency on its progress to *duḥkha*, undercut it, and, by dint of all that, arrive at the reversal and liberation through knowledge of these *vitarkas*. Knowledge (*jñāna*) has already the counter-directional tendency. By constant repetition, exercise (*niveśana*), i. e. quantitative increase, the quality of *himsā* will change in this way into the quality of *ahimsā*, and by constant gradation, i. e. again by quantitative increase, of *ahimsā* new qualities (*siddhis*) will be attained, which are signs of proper procedure in the Yoga practices. By dialectical antithesis, by quantitative increase, by change of quality is determined the practice of *yamas* and *niyamas*.

Hence it follows indisputably that the practice of *yamas* and *niyamas* is a Yoga practice, since in them, too, we have found the "peace-giving moment".

K r i y ā y o g a.

The results ascertained should be first confronted with other sūtras which contain the elements of *niyamas*, i. e. with *Kriyāyoga*¹⁾ and *īśvara-praṇidhāna*.²⁾

*Kriyāyoga*³⁾ lists three elements of *niyamas* — *tapas*, *svādhyāya* and *īśvarapraṇidhāna*. Their purpose is⁴⁾ *samādhibhāvana* and *kleśatanūkarana*, i. e. bringing about *samādhi* (meditation) and attenuating afflictions. The subject of this sūtra is precisely what we have arrived at by the analysis of the first two *aṅgas*. We find here the antithesis of *samādhi* and *kleśa* as opposite poles, and still clearer is outlined the process of *pratipakṣabhā-*

¹⁾ II, 1 sqq.

²⁾ I, 23 sqq.

³⁾ II, 1.

⁴⁾ II, 2.

vana = *kleśatanūkarana*, which is a presupposition to *samādhībhāvana*.⁵⁾

In this manner Kriyāyoga fills a deficiency found in the difference between the first two *aṅgas*, for in Kriyāyoga the first place is given to *samādhībhāvana*, i. e. progress in the direction of *jñānadīptirāvivekakhyāteḥ*,⁶⁾ and the second to *kleśatanūkarana*, which is the exercise *yamas* are starting with. This circumstance is also explicitly confirmed by *V y ā s a*:⁷⁾ *pratipakṣabhāvanopahatāḥ kleśāstanavo bhavanti* = the afflictions become attenuated when they are repressed by the practice of their opposites. *B h o j a*⁸⁾ gives an analogous explanation: *teṣāṃ tanūkaranaṃ svakāryakaraṇapratibandhaḥ* = the attenuating of them is to oppose their producing their effects.

Hence in Kriyāyoga we have another process of *pratipakṣabhāvana*, yet, although we are countenanced by the coinciding explanation given by the commentators, it is upon us to prove that.

Kriyāyoga offers a more accurate instruction how to discern correctly *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*. While II, 29 sqq does not say exactly wherein consists *ajñāna*, *duḥkha*, and the emotive and energetical constituent, all this is supplied by Kriyāyoga. Or better, as for the practices of the first two *aṅgas* given in II, 29 sqq., the acquaintance with those conceptions is taken for granted.

As early as when commenting on the enumeration of *kleśas*,⁹⁾ *V y ā s a* reminds us that *kleśas* constitute the five kinds of *viparyayaś*: *Kleśā iti pañca viparyayā ityarthah* = *Kleśas* are five aspects of misconception. According to II, 3, the *kleśas* are: *avidyā* (ignorance), *āsmittā* (self-consciousness), *rāga* (desire), *dveṣa* (aversion), *abhiniveśa* (tenacity — of mundane existence). As we see, they represent emotive constituents, directional tendencies, as well as intellectual elements. The groundwork of all is *avidyā*:¹⁰⁾ *avidyā kṣetramuttareṣāṃ* = *avidyā* is the field of the others, to which *V y ā s a* aptly supplements, *prasavabhūmiḥ* = the productive soil, and points out¹¹⁾ that: *avidyā na pramāṇaṃ na pramāṇābhāvaḥ kim tu vidyāviparītaṃ jñānāntaram avidyeti* = ignorance is neither right cognition, nor negation of right cognition, it is a distinct kind of cognition, different from right cognition; and cites as example *amitra* (enemy), something contrary (*viruddha*) to *mitra* (friend).

*B h o j a*¹²⁾ holds *moha* on equal footing with *avidyā*, and hence puts *moha* on the first place (*mohapūrvikā*); having in this manner amalgam-

⁵⁾ *Samādhīḥ* = *ekāgratā*, i. e. intentness on a single point (*Bhoja* to I, 20).

⁶⁾ II, 28.

⁷⁾ To II, 4.

⁸⁾ To II, 2.

⁹⁾ In II, 3.

¹⁰⁾ II, 4.

¹¹⁾ To II, 5.

¹²⁾ To II, 4 and 34.

ated Kriyāyoga with *pratipakṣabhāvana*, he criticizes its incorrect order of sequence. As a warning it is very symptomatic, for it shows that in *pratipakṣabhāvana* the individual constituents — emotive, intellectual and energetical — remain undistinguished whereas in Kriyāyoga this distinction is carried out in a far clearer form; similarly the final goal of Kriyāyoga is stated¹³⁾ as *samādhibhāvana* — *kleśatanūkarana*, in contrast to the rather incomplete *pratipakṣabhāvana*. Although the essence of both these practices given in Kriyāyoga¹⁴⁾ and *yamaniyamās*¹⁵⁾ is the same, still Kriyāyoga characterizes them in a better and more accurate manner. This concordance of the two may be an indication of the identity of a time-honoured conception, a Yoga tradition, disguised under two expressions.

In Kriyāyoga the sūtras uphold¹⁶⁾ *avidyā* as groundwork (*kṣetra*) of all the other constituents of the *kleśas*. Its opposite pole is *vidyā*. Vyāsa¹⁷⁾ contrasts *vivekakhyāti* and *mithyājñāna*, which is the sign of *viparyaya*¹⁸⁾ made identical with the five-fold *avidyā*,¹⁹⁾ and cites also other terms, among them also *moha* precisely like Bhoja who, likewise, contrasts *avidyā* and *samyagjñāna*.²⁰⁾ In *Vācaspati*²¹⁾ the following antitheses (*pratipakṣas*) are listed: *samyagjñāna* — *avidyā*, *bhedadarśana* (difference of *citta* and *puruṣa*) — *āsmitā*, *mādhyaṣṭhya* (indifference) — *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *anubandhabuddhinvṛtti* — *abhiniveśa*. Hence *avidyā* is undiscriminating (*aviveka*) knowledge, lacking in analysis; and this again substantiates, though from a different angle, our previously established result that the purpose of *pratipakṣabhāvana* is dissection of knowledge, discernment of the constituents of knowledge, and thereby removal of false knowledge. The main element is²²⁾ *avidyā* — the intellectual constituent, which becomes the groundwork for everything else, and the whole Yoga process is meant to develop this intellectual constituent from *avidyā* up to perfect discrimination (*viveka*). In the other *kleśas* the constituent *rāga*, denoting *lobha*,²³⁾ *dveṣa*, is employed as equal to *krodha*.

Hence we see that the constituents of *pratipakṣabhāvana* and Kriyāyoga share common features: *avidyā* — *moha*, *rāga* — *lobha*, *dveṣa* — *krodha*; then in Kriyāyoga there is a further sub-division: *āsmitā* and *abhiniveśa*

¹³⁾ In II, 2.

¹⁴⁾ II, 1 sqq.

¹⁵⁾ II, 20 sqq.

¹⁶⁾ II, 4.

¹⁷⁾ To II, 26.

¹⁸⁾ I, 8.

¹⁹⁾ As given in II, 4.

²⁰⁾ To II, 4.

²¹⁾ To II, 4.

²²⁾ According to II, 4.

²³⁾ Vyāsa to II, 7.

as directional tendencies. We notice that in this respect Kriyāyoga is more elaborate and appears to have more developed features.

Quite as much can be said about the energetical constituent. In *yamas* and *niyamas* three degrees are found: *mṛdu-madhya-adhimātra*, whereas in Kriyāyoga there are four: *prasupta-tanu-vicchinna-udāraṇa*,²⁴⁾ i e., dormant-attenuated-intercepted-operative. This gradation concerns all the constituents other than *avidyā*.²⁵⁾ *Vācaspati*²⁶⁾ gives correctly the four states of *kleśas* (*catasro 'vasthā*). Particularly characteristic is in *Vyāsa*²⁷⁾ the comparison to the cleaning of a piece of cloth, that as the coarser particles of dust are first shaken off and the finer particles are then removed by greater effort (*yatnena*) and special methods (*upayena*), so in the same manner the rougher elements of *kleśas* are suppressed by simpler devices (*svalpapratipakṣāḥ*), whilst the subtler ones are suppressed by more elaborate methods (*mahāpratipakṣāḥ*).

Kriyāyoga does not refer to any practice leading to *kleśatanūkarāṇa*, but the commentators mention²⁸⁾ *pratipakṣabhāvana*. Thus *Vyāsa*: *pratipakṣabhāvanopahatāḥ kleśāstanavo bhavanti* — the afflictions become attenuated when they are suppressed by the practice of their opposites. And he concludes by saying: *yathaiva pratipakṣabhāvanāto nivṛttastathaiva svavyañjakoñjanenābhividyakta iti* — these afflictions appear (and become operative) through their cause (in the shape of brooding over the objects of senses), in the same way as they are suppressed by the practice of their opposites (in the shape of Yoga discipline). *Bhoja* holds the same view: *te tanavaḥ ye svasvapratipakṣabhāvanayā* ... *Vācaspati* offers coinciding explanation, and sets against *avidyā*, as a *pratipakṣa*, *samyagjñāna*.²⁹⁾ *Bhoja* then advises *pratipakṣabhāvana* also as a practice for the removal of *avidyā*:³⁰⁾ *pratipakṣabhāvanābalāḍavidyāpravilaye* ... = when *avidyā* is dissolved by the force of meditation on what is opposed to it ...

On the other hand, Kriyāyoga lists also other *bhāvanas* aiming at *samādhi*, ending by the removal of *avidyā* and the attainment of the supreme degree of knowledge (*prānta-bhūmi-prajñā*).³¹⁾

From these facts we see that in principle the first *aṅgas* have common features with Kriyāyoga, yet Kriyāyoga is more elaborate, more accurate, more discriminative. The commentators were right in associating these two kinds by reason of the practice of *pratipakṣabhāvana*, common to both.

²⁴⁾ II, 4.

²⁵⁾ II, 4: *avidyā kṣetramuttareṣāṃ prasuptatanuvicchinnoḍārāṇām*.

²⁶⁾ To II, 11.

²⁷⁾ To II, 11.

²⁸⁾ To II, 4.

²⁹⁾ *Bhoja*, I, 25 and elsewhere.

³⁰⁾ To II, 26.

³¹⁾ II, 27.

Hence it can be said that the two kinds are not opposed to each other, but complementary. Kriyāyoga gives a more accurate instruction to facilitate the right decision in the adoption of a *pratipakṣa*; *yamas* and *niyamas* then specify the best suitable method for the practice.

Īśvarapraṇidhāna

To make the analysis of the first two aṅgas complete it is indispensable to pay particular attention to the last factor in the *niyamas* — *īśvarapraṇidhāna*.¹⁾ The vital character of this part becomes clear also from the description of Yoga as *śeśvarasāṃkhyā* against that of *sāṃkhyā* as *nirīśvarasāṃkhyā*; hence *īśvarapraṇidhāna* belongs to the old Yoga tradition.

Īśvara gave stimulus to endless discussions as being something completely isolated from the Yoga system, and even clashing with the assumptions and goals of Yoga. It was pointed out that the commentators endeavoured in vain to ensure *īśvarapraṇidhāna* a firmer stand in the Yoga system,²⁾ particularly under the influence of the then prevailing Bhāgavata religion. Jacobi drew attention to the original significance of *praṇidhāna* — “intensives Nachdenken, Meditieren”, hence substantially the same as that of *bhāvana*. It seemed to him that in I, 28 *īśvarapraṇidhāna* meant a little more than with the *niyamas*, although he added, “doch ist es in letzter Linie dasselbe” Lindquist³⁾ considered the Yoga method and *īśvarapraṇidhāna* as two heterogeneous methods, linked together by *om* as intervening member. J. V. Haue⁴⁾ assumed different texts for *īśvarapraṇidhāna* in I, 28, II, 40 and II, 1, which was a corrected version of, or perhaps an addition to, the *yogāṅga* text. On comparing the methodical arrangement of these texts we shall be able to decide whether a different conception or an identical methodical procedure is involved.

Both *īśvarapraṇidhāna* as part of *niyamas* in II, 40 and that in Kriyāyoga II, 1, have been identified by us as procedures which in principle are the same, though at the same time Kriyāyoga actually supplements *pratipakṣabhāvana* by its elaborateness and more accurate discernment of the constituents of *pratipakṣabhāvana*. The position of *īśvarapraṇidhāna* corresponds to the other features of *niyamas* as well as Kriyāyoga. In I, 23 *īśvarapraṇidhāna* stands isolated, though in the subsequent text it is connected with *svādhyāya*, whose feature is constant repetition of the sacred syllable *om*.⁵⁾

1) Linking up *niyamas* in II, 32 with *Kriyāyoga* and the first part of the sūtras I, 23 sqq.

2) R. Garbe: *Samkhya und Yoga*, 1896, p. 50; Paul Tuxen: *Yoga*, 1911, ZDMG, p. 843; H. Jacobi: *Ueber das ursprüngliche Yogasystem*, 1929, p. 616 sqq., 605.

3) *Die Methoden des Yoga*, 1932, p. 200.

4) *Der Yoga als Heilweg*, 1932, p. 94 and elsewhere.

5) I, 28. See Jacobi, l. c., p. 605.

In throwing more light on this problem we cannot omit some remarks of the commentaries, which may lend support to our further deductions. Thus Vyāsa⁶⁾ used the word *pranidhāna* in the meaning of "turning to": ...*na vitarkeṣu manāḥ pranidadhāta* = one should never allow his mind to be turned towards the *vitarkas*. *Pranidadhāti* signifies "to direct towards" — *pranidhānam* is orientation in the direction of something, hence intensive thinking, energy, great effort, and ultimately profound religious meditation. *Īśvarapranidhāna* means, hence, an intensive orientation of one's mind to Īśvara. In this meaning it is coupled with *śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā*.⁷⁾ *Śraddhā* being "belief, strong desire, longing", expresses an attitude, intentness towards something, and Vyāsa explains it rightly by the word *vivekārthin* (one who seeks for discrimination). The other factors in I, 20 express progress towards *prajñā*, a process towards *saṁprajñāta samādhi* as claimed concordantly by the commentaries. I, 21 and 22 determine the speed and intensity of this procedure, and the orientation of one's mind to Īśvara in I, 23 constitutes one of these intensive procedures.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu⁸⁾ explained *śraddhā* by *yoge prītiḥ* — liking or fondness for Yoga, whereby he likewise stressed the intentness on the goals of Yoga, for he said further: *teṣāṁ copāyānāmatisīghratīvratarānuṣṭhānādāsannataro' saṁprajñātaparyantayogastatphalaṁ mokṣaśca bhavati. Upāyānuṣṭhānamāndye 'pi ceśvarapranidhānādāsannatarau tau bhavataḥ* = when these (five *śraddhās* etc.) are employed with great impetuosity and intensity, then consecutively follow abstract meditation and its effect *mokṣa* (liberation). Even when there is some amount of sluggishness (*māndya* = weakness) in the employment of these means (sc. *śraddhā* etc.), the two results (abstract meditation and liberation) are almost consecutively brought about by *īśvarapranidhāna*.

Bhoja⁹⁾ considers *īśvarapranidhāna* as *sugama* — an easy, more accessible method.

In that sense may be explained Paṭaṅjali's sūtras, for this intensified effort is a sign both for *niyamas* and for Kriyāyoga, and we encounter it also in this case.

The practice for *īśvarapranidhāna* is *japa* and *tadarthabhāvana*, i. e.¹⁰⁾ assiduous repetition of the sacred syllable *om* as well as repeated bringing of Īśvara into one's mind,¹¹⁾ or, concentration on Īśvara.¹²⁾

⁶⁾ To II, 34.

⁷⁾ I, 20.

⁸⁾ *Yogasārasaṁgraha*, p. 18.

⁹⁾ To I, 23.

¹⁰⁾ I, 28.

¹¹⁾ Bhoja to I, 28: *īśvarasya bhāvanam punaḥ punaścetasi viniveśanam*.

¹²⁾ *Pranidhānam* in the Nyāya-sūtras III b 41, means according to Ruben „Nachdenken, Fixieren des inneren Organes auf das, dessen man sich zu erinnern wünscht”.

In this manner the *īśvarapranīdhāna* method¹³⁾ proceeds again in the reversed direction towards *samādhi* like Kriyāyoga,¹⁴⁾ while in *niyamas* this direction is a result of practice; or better said, in I, 23 and I, 1 we find distinguished that which in II, 40 is separated. Like in II, 45 the new quality after the removal of the *vitarka* is called *samādhisiddhi* (perfection of *samādhi*), in II, 1 it is *samādhi-bhāvana* and *kleśatanūkarana*, and in II, 29 *pratyakcetanā adhigama* and *antarāyābhava* (introversion and absence of obstacles).

So in our above discussion of the first two places¹⁵⁾ we were able to ascertain the agreement of the two methods. Let us now examine also I, 29 sqq., to see whether there are coincidences or differences in respect to the first two methods.

S. D a s G u p t a¹⁶⁾ discovers two senses to *īśvarapranīdhāna* according to the commentators. While in I, 28 it means love or devotion to God as the one centre of meditation, in the second book (II, 1 and II, 45) it is used to mean the abnegation of all desires of the fruits of action to *Īśvara*, and in this sense it is included under Kriyāyoga.

S. R a d h a k r i s h n a n¹⁷⁾ endorses G a r b e's opinion¹⁸⁾ that I, 23—27 and II, 1 and 45 (that is the discourses referring to *īśvarapranīdhāna*) are without connection with the other parts of the textbook, nay, even contradict the foundation of the system. R a d h a k r i s h n a n then explains that the Yoga philosophy introduced the conception of God just to be in the fashion and catch the mind of the public. But no matter on what grounds *īśvarapranīdhāna* was introduced into Yoga system — and that in it a characteristic feature of the original Yoga doctrine is encountered is clear from the differentiation of Yoga from Sāṃkhya in the guise of *seśvara* as against *nirīśvara* — it is important to know if the term *īśvarapranīdhāna* was used by P a t a ṅ j a l i in more than one meaning and if it is actually unconnected with, or even contradictory to, the other parts of this system. In the course of this investigation we must, however, be starting from P a t a ṅ j a l i himself, as the commentators are apt to give explanations modelled after the tendencies of their respective times and often fail to interpret P a t a ṅ j a l i's intention correctly.

To solve the problem of the unspecified meaning of *īśvarapranīdhāna*, which is different in Book I and II, it is necessary to explain after P a t a ṅ j a l i that the function of *īśvarapranīdhāna* is of the same nature as other aids to the attainment of the Yoga process, stipulated in II, 28 —

¹³⁾ I, 23 sqq.

¹⁴⁾ II, 1.

¹⁵⁾ II, 40 sqq., and II, 1.

¹⁶⁾ The Study of Patanjali, 1920, pp. 148, 150, 164 sqq.

¹⁷⁾ Indian Philosophy, II, p. 371.

¹⁸⁾ The Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 15.

aśuddhikṣaye jñānadiptirā vivekakhyāteḥ, whose goal is reaching *asamprajñāta samādhi*.

Now this process is stated unequivocally¹⁹⁾ for *pratipakṣabhāvana* and elsewhere²⁰⁾ to be *samādhi-siddhi*; quite in harmony with that is, that in *Kriyāyoga* we have the meaning of *īśvarapraṇidhāna* given²¹⁾ as *samādhi bhāvana* and *kleśatanāikaraṇa*. To this corresponds²²⁾ *japa* and *bhāvana*, along with their results²³⁾ *pratyakcetanādhigama* and *antarāyābhāva*. In the first book the function of *īśvarapraṇidhāna*, too, is given²⁴⁾ as *ekatattvābhyāsa*. In I, 39 then *Patañjali* points out that in the process the person or thing is immaterial: *yathābhimatadhyānādvā* = or by meditation according to one's predilection — after having enumerated six of such possibilities.²⁵⁾ Moreover, on close connection with *īśvarapraṇidhāna* a procedure analogous to *pratipakṣabhāvana* is given²⁶⁾ towards attaining *citta-prasādana* — peace of mind, wherein the *bhāvana* of the antithesis *maitrī karuṇā muditā upekṣā* against *sukha dukkha puṇya apuṇya* is involved.

Also the evidence gathered from the commentators' interpretations justifies such a viewpoint. The functional orientation of the Yoga procedure is expressed very aptly by *Bhoja*:²⁷⁾ *yathā gaṇite miśrakādivyavahāra gaṇitanīṣpattaye saṃkalitādikarmopakāṛakatvena pradhānakarmanīṣpattaye prabhavati evam dveṣarāgādipratipakṣabhūtamaitrīyādibhāvanayā samutpāditaprasādaṃ cittaṃ samprajñātādisamādhiyogyam saṃpadyate. Rāga-dveṣāveva mukhyatayā vikṣepamutpādayataḥ. Tau cet samūlam unmulitau syātām tadā prasannatvānmanaso bhavatyevaikāgratā* = Even as in arithmetic, addition and the like are useful (valuable) in the calculation of alligation etc., so the feelings of friendships etc. antagonistic to envy, passion, etc., producing tranquillity, prepare the thinking principle (*citta*) for the conscious form of *samādhi*. Passion and envy are the chief causes of distractions. When these are thoroughly eradicated, the cheerfulness induced, ensues the concentration of the mind on the one object. In this comparison to arithmetical operations, to their functional orientation,²⁸⁾ is expressed the entire methodical outlook of Yoga, for its individual me-

¹⁹⁾ In II, 34.

²⁰⁾ In II, 45.

²¹⁾ II, 2.

²²⁾ I, 28.

²³⁾ I, 29.

²⁴⁾ I, 32.

²⁵⁾ I, 33—39.

²⁶⁾ I, 23 sqq.

²⁷⁾ To I, 33.

²⁸⁾ Starting with I, 33, the procedure is denoted by the word *parikarmaṇ*, which in the Yoga philosophy signifies a means of purifying the mind; otherwise this word served to denote an arithmetical operation, of which there are 8 divisions.

thods aim at the final goal, which is the supreme stage *nirbīja samādhi* (*kaivalya*).

B h o j a has outlined here also the *pratipakṣabhāvana* procedure, for I, 33 supplements the progress of II, 34 from *himsā* to *ahimsā* and further towards *ahimsāpratiṣṭhā*, II, 35. Hence in I, 33 is stipulated another progressive link of the positive *pratipakṣabhāvana*, which is tacitly assumed in II, 34.

B h o j a²⁹⁾ particularizes this positive practice in a series of antitheses: *maitrīm kuryānnatvārṣyām*, *kṛpāmeva kuryānna tāṭasthyam*, *harṣam kuryānna... dveṣam*, *audāsīnyameva bhāvayennānumodanam na dveṣam* = friendliness (*maitrī*) — envy (*ārṣya*), compassion (*kṛpā*) — indifference (*tāṭasthyam*), complacency (*harṣa*) — aversion (*dveṣa*), apathy (*audāsīnyam*) — sympathy (*anumodanam*). The connection of *cittaprasādana* I, 33 with *pratipakṣabhāvana* II, 34 is referred to by V y ā s a³⁰⁾ when he gives *lobhakrodhamoha* as the cause of *pun्यāpunyakarmāśaya*. Inasmuch as *Īśvara* I, 24 is defined as *karmāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ*, is V y ā s a's association of I, 23 sqq. to II, 34 very symptomatic, since for *yamas*, *pranīdhāna* in principle the same procedure must be assumed as for *yamas*, the other *niyamas*, and *Kriyāyoga*, despite the fact that in I, 33 it is the positive *bhāvana* that is being emphasized as against the negative *bhāvana* in II, 34. The two, of course, do not stand against each other, but hang closely together and both are part of a single methodical procedure.

In Book I *īśvarapranīdhāna* tends towards *antarāyābhāva* — absence of obstacles which disturb the mind. They are:³¹⁾ *vyādhi-styāna-saṁśaya-pramāda-ālasya-avirati-bhrāntidarśana-alabdha-bhūmikatva-anavasthitatvāni cittavikṣepās te 'ntarāyāḥ* = disease, languor, doubt, carelessness, want of energy, absence of non-attachment, erroneous perception, non-attainment of the stage, instability — these distractors of the mind are obstacles.

With these are associated further ones:³²⁾ *duḥkha-daurmanasya-aṅgamejayatva-śvāsapraśvāsā vikṣepasahabhavaḥ* = pain, irritation, trembling, in-breathing, out-breathing (without conscious effort) are the companions of distractions.

The list of these *antarāyas* is interesting also in that respect that they contain, in an obscured form, elements of the subsequent *aṅgas*: *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra*. They include both emotive, intellectual, and energetical elements, as well as the possibility of change of the qualities.

A feature of these *antarāyas* common with *vitarkas* and *kleśas* is that,

²⁹⁾ To I, 33.

³⁰⁾ To I, 12.

³¹⁾ According to I, 30.

³²⁾ I, 31.

being inhibitions from attaining *samādhi*, they must be removed from the way leading to *samādhi*.

Both Bhoja and Vyāsa³³⁾ indicate, too, that *antarāyas* are antithetical to *samādhi*: *ekāgratāvirodhāḥ*, *yogamalā*, *yogapratipakṣā*, *yogāntarāyā*, *samādhipratipakṣāḥ*, equally as the *vitarkas* are³⁴⁾ *yogaparipanthināḥ*. Functionally all these belong to *aśuddhi* and methodically to *aśuddhi-kṣaya*,³⁵⁾ which in I, 29 is expressed by the word *antarāyābhāva*, in II, 2 as *kleśatanūkarana* and in II, 32 as *vitarkāḥ* — *pratipakṣabhāvanam*. What with the methodical and functional side they reveal an identical principle, that is, causing a reversal towards the introvert process by suppression, removal and analysis.

This introvert process is in I, 29 purported by *pratyakcetanādhigama*, corresponding to *samādhībhāvana* in II, 2 and to *pratiṣṭhā* in II, 33 sqq. In this respect I, 29 and II, 2 are more precise and so they even supplement II, 33 sqq.

Pratyakcetanādhigama means an introvert process³⁶⁾ which is in antithesis to *antarāyas* and denotes the same direction towards *samādhi* as given in II, 2 and II, 45.

As the commentaries, too, contain references touching upon the nature of this process, we can deduce from those the original meaning of *īśvara-praṇidhāna*. Patañjali³⁷⁾ cited another method how to remove *antarāyas*, that is, *ekatattvābhīyāsa* — practice on the one principle, which Vācaspati Miśra identified with *Īśvara*. Hence *īśvarapraṇidhāna* is one of the methods conducive to the attainment of the aims of Yoga. Vyāsa³⁸⁾ and especially Vācaspati Miśra preserved the original meaning and manner of this method, which corresponds to other similar methods. It is Vācaspati who made it particularly clear: "Whereas prolonged meditation upon one object proves to be of service for the direct perception of another similar to it, similarly the study of one book proves to be of service for the acquisition of knowledge of another book similar to it." The point is in the approaching (*adhigama*), or beter, adaptation, assimilation to *Īśvara*.³⁹⁾

Īśvara is therefore marked out as the supreme point, towards which the Yoga way leads in the case of every individual. That it used to be

³³⁾ To I, 30.

³⁴⁾ To II, 33.

³⁵⁾ II, 28.

³⁶⁾ *Pratyak* — in an opposite direction, which is being translated by J. W. Hauer as „Zugang zur Geisteshaltung der Einkehr”.

³⁷⁾ I, 32.

³⁸⁾ To I, 29.

³⁹⁾ Similar assimilation is cited in I, 37, 39, 41, when both Vyāsa and Vācaspati employ the word *uparakta*—tinged, coloured.

understood in this way is shown also by the polemic of *Vyāsa*⁴⁰⁾ with the view — *Kaivalyaṃ prāptāstarhi santi ca bahavaḥ kevalinaḥ* — and it points out just where lies the difference between *Īśvara* and other *kevalinas* who attained supreme *samādhi*. This polemic of *Vyāsa*, too, indicates that *īśvarapranidhāna* originally was one of the methodical aids. It can be shown also from the definition of *Īśvara* given in I, 24, the antithesis to whom is in II, 12. I, 24: *kleśa karma vipāka āśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣa viśeṣa īśvaraḥ* — *Īśvara* is a particular *puruṣa* untouched by afflictions, works, fruits and by latent deposits. The man just yields to all these influences, is burdened by the *kleśas* and actions springing therefrom, so that everything is suffering (*duḥkham*) for the knower.⁴¹⁾ In this antithesis is contained the scope of the Yoga procedure, removal of the oncoming suffering,⁴²⁾ removal of the cause of the suffering — *avidyā*,⁴³⁾ and attainment of *kaivalya* — complete salvation,⁴⁴⁾ *nirbīja samādhi*,⁴⁵⁾ which is a state identical with *Īśvara*, for in *Īśvara* the good qualities belonging to man reach their limit. *Vyāsa*⁴⁶⁾ in his criticism differentiated *Īśvara* from other *puruṣas* that had attained the supreme state and were⁴⁷⁾ pure and liberated, only by *Īśvara*'s being *sadaiva muktaḥ* — at all times liberated.

The commentators in their polemics enlarge upon the theory on *Īśvara*, yet the vital issue in Yoga was not so much concerning this theory than a suitable means leading to the attainment of the goal. *Patañjali* cites various methods for the introvert reversal and the turning of one's mind to God — *īśvarapranidhāna* is an efficient methodical expedient founded also on experience. It can therefore be assumed that *īśvarapranidhāna* belonged to the original methodical expedients and that it was not introduced into the Yoga-system just in order to gratify and to win over the people, for it was consistent, both methodically and functionally, with the complete Yoga process, as evident from the comparison with other methods. Although *Patañjali* might have amalgamated several schools (texts) of Yoga,⁴⁸⁾ still *īśvarapranidhāna* had been comprised in them, so that rightly was Yoga called *śeśvarasāṃkhya* as against *Kapila*'s *nirīśvara-sāṃkhya*. The evolutionary changes of *īśvarapranidhāna*, particularly as they are reflected in the various commentaries, cannot be followed here, having no direct connection with our present theme.

⁴⁰⁾ To I, 24.

⁴¹⁾ II, 12, 13, 14, 15.

⁴²⁾ II, 16.

⁴³⁾ II, 24 and IV, 30.

⁴⁴⁾ II, 25, IV, 34.

⁴⁵⁾ I, 51.

⁴⁶⁾ To I, 24.

⁴⁷⁾ To I, 51.

⁴⁸⁾ As supposed by J. W. Hauer.

Results.

At this point we can again summarize the results arrived at hitherto, insofar as they give solutions to the following foreshadowed problems: (1) if *yamas* and *niyamas* were practices of Yoga, (2) if the "peace-giving moment" was manifest in them in the same measure as in other *aṅgas*, (3) if *siddhis* were effected through *yamas* and *niyamas* automatically or as a result of their practice (4) if *īśvarapraṇidhāna* contradicted methodology of the Yoga practices, and (5) if the technical precepts of Yoga were irrelevant.⁴⁹⁾

In the first place it must be borne in mind that *yamas* and *niyamas* were practised by exercise of *pratīpakṣabhāvana*, and that both the negative and positive ones.⁵⁰⁾ The purpose of the practice is the attainment of the supreme intentness by analysis of *vitarkas*, i. e. the antitheses of *yamas* and *niyamas*. Such analysis undercuts the emotive element, tending towards *duḥkha*, so that a disengagement, a reversal, ensues. The reversal is marked by the *vitarka* failing to come about, whereby the *yama* and *niyama* is achieved — which is the basis for disengagement and for subsidence. Or else, the reversal may be achieved by means of a positive practice, running counter to the *vitarka*, whereby the *vitarkas* get weaker as their antitheses get stronger. The weakening of the *vitarka* is a sign for both positive and negative *bhāvana* in the same way as the strengthening of the *yama* and *niyama*. By dint of constant and repeated practice (*bhāvana*) the procedures in the *yamas* and *niyamas* become fortified so that in the qualitative respect the latter change into *siddhis*. What is therefore involved is essentially a qualitative change caused by quantitative increase (*bhāvana*). Thus, *hiṃsā* changes into *ahiṃsā*, *ahiṃsā* again into *vairatyāga*, and the same also happens with the factors of the *yamas* and *niyamas*. The attainment of *siddhis* is a sign of a correct Yoga procedure, though not an aim of Yoga. The *siddhis* do not come about of themselves, but through an increase of the effort, through practice, increase — *bhāvana*.

The same procedure applies in *īśvarapraṇidhāna*, which is a constituent of *niyamas*, Kriyāyoga and the first part of the sūtras. *Īśvara* is endowed with features — *kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāṃrṣṭaḥ*, which in other *puṛuṣas* appear in antithesis as *parāṃrṣṭaḥ*. As a result of constant comparison and thinking, i. e. concentration on *Īśvara* (*īśvarapraṇidhāna*), is again achieved great intentness, a reversal, through the weakening of the *kleśas* and *antarāyas*. *Samādhi* is attained through incessant intensification of this concentration on *Īśvara* by no other route than across *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyaṇa*, for the mind, fixing itself untiringly on one object,⁵¹⁾

⁴⁹⁾ „An und für sich gleichgültig” — Lindquist, p. 200.

⁵⁰⁾ II, 33, 34, I, 33.

⁵¹⁾ III, 1: *deśabandhaḥ*.

concentrating solely on it, becomes more and more amalgamated with it,⁵²⁾ until it attains *samādhi*. Hence *īśvarapraṇidhāna* is one of the effective methodical means to attain the goal of Yoga, and as such it must have been one of the parts of the original Yoga — *seśvarasāṃkhya*.

This also marks off features common to the practices of *yamas* and *niyamas*, *Kriyāyoga* and *īśvarapraṇidhāna*. The first feature is the fixation of *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*. The antitheses for the *yamas* and *niyamas* are the *vitarkas*. For *Kriyāyoga* there exists the antithesis of *samādhi* and the *kleśas*. For *īśvarapraṇidhāna*, *Īśvara* with its features of *kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭah*, stands against *puruṣa* which is characterized by these features as *parāmṛṣṭah*.⁵³⁾

The practice applying for *yamas* and *niyamas* is *pratipakṣabhāvana*, that for *īśvarapraṇidhāna* is *tajjapastadarthabhāvana*. The results obtained with the *yamas* and *niyamas* are *siddhis*, to which in *Kriyāyoga* correspond *samādhībhāvana* and *kleśatanūkarana*, and with *īśvarapraṇidhāna* there are *pratyakcetanādhigama* and *antarāyābhāva*. The vital point with the practices is the reversal of the extrovert tendency into an introvert one. We can achieve this if we find the opposite pole, the antithesis, separate out the intellectual constituents — *mōha*, *avidyā*, *bhrāntidarśana*, the emotional ones — *krodha*, *lobha*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and the energetical ones, then by an analysis of the constituents we undercut the emotive constituent, and in the reversal intensify the antithetical intellectual constituent — *vidyā*. Now that we have removed the obstacles on the way to *samādhi*, such as the *vitarkas*, *kleśas*, *antarāyas*, we may comply with the first requirement cited in II, 28, "*aśuddhikṣaye*" in the direction of "*jñānadīptir ...*".

This approach is common to all the constituents of *yamas* and *niyamas*, as something inherently indispensable towards reaching the goals of Yoga. To what extent those *aṅgas* are fundamentally bound with the rest, that is, whether the methods of *yamas* and *niyamas* correspond to the methods of further *aṅgas*, is a question that can be settled by their comparison.

Ā s a n a.

It might seem an easy thing to give an explanation of the third *aṅga* — *āsana*, yet on closer examination we see how our effort is hampered by considerable difficulties. On one hand, there is the *Hāthayoga*, laying stress on *āsana*, and citing eighty-four kinds thereof, then *Gheraṇḍa Saṃhita* with 32, *Svātmārāma* with 15, *Mādhava* with 10, *Vyāsa* with 12, and last but not least the *Mahābhārata* also with several kinds,¹⁾ and this is a proof of the great importance attached to *āsana*. On the other

⁵²⁾ III, 2, 3.

⁵³⁾ II, 12—16.

¹⁾ XIII, 142; XII, 304.

hand, Lindquist²⁾ infers from Patañjali and also from the commentaries that the eminence it enjoyed should have been none too great, although the text contains several significant places concerning *āsana*. Hence Jacobi³⁾ concludes from the fact that *āsana* is not cited in the Maitrī-Up., that *āsana*, unlike *yama* and *niyama*, was not held equivalent to the other practices of Yoga.

Still, it is a known fact that every work, every operation involves attention to the bodily attitude, so that even a religious activity is accompanied by various postures of the body, such as kneeling by clasped hands, and the like. It is here quite to the point to observe with Radhakrishnan,⁴⁾ that we cannot fix our attention on an object when we are running or sleeping. We must settle down in a convenient posture before we begin to meditate. The Yoga doctrine realizes that our body has a dignity of its own, as much as the mind. *Āsana* or posture is a physical help to concentration, as emphasized already in Bhagavad Gītā.⁵⁾

It should be shown by subsequent analysis whether Patañjali underrated *āsana* and set no great store by it. Patañjali⁶⁾ cites as the features of *āsana*: *sthiraśukham āsanam* = a posture is what is steady and pleasant. Vyāsa,⁷⁾ in addition to eleven various postures, cites *sthiraśukham yathāśukham cetyevamādini* = the stable and easy — also called, as-is-easiest — and others of the same kind; in other words — they are at one's discretion. Basing on such explanation, Lindquist⁸⁾ maintains that it would make little sense in Patañjali's Yoga to emphasize for the yogī the necessity for complete familiarity with *āsana*, if the best *āsanas* were *yathāśukha*. The same, however, might by equal right be said about the practices of *cittaprasādana*,⁹⁾ where Patañjali, on enumerating six different methods, finally declares:¹⁰⁾ *yathābhīmatadhyānād vā* = or by meditation according to one's predilection. It is because neither here nor in *āsana* Patañjali concerns himself with a particular method but the realization of a methodical principle, no matter by what methodical approach this principle may become manifest. Hence it is right for Vyāsa to say: *yathāśukham āsanam*, since everyone can choose any posture he pleases, if only during

²⁾ Die Methoden des Yoga, pp. 32, 34, 38.

³⁾ Ueber das ursprüngliche Yogasystem, p. 602.

⁴⁾ Indian Philosophy, II, p. 354.

⁵⁾ VI, 10; II, 46; etc.

⁶⁾ II, 46.

⁷⁾ To II, 46. (*Sthiraśukha* — see also Hemacandra: Yogaśāstra IV, 133, 134.)

⁸⁾ L. c., p. 32, 34.

⁹⁾ I, 33 sqq.

¹⁰⁾ I, 39.

such a practice are fulfilled the requirements laid down generally for the *āsana* in question, in order to reach the Yoga goals.¹¹⁾

The same outlook is very distinct also in the commentaries. Thus B h o j a says:¹²⁾ *tadyadā sthīraṃ niṣkampaṃ sukhaṃ anudvejanīyaṃ bhavati tadā tadyogāṅgatām bhajate* = when this is steady, not wavering, and pleasant, not uncomfortable, then this serves as a subservient to Yoga. We see how he builds the antithesis: *sthira* is *niṣkampa*, *sukha* is *anudvejanīya*. V ā c a s p a t i¹³⁾ put *sthira* as *niścala* (immovable), and *sukha* as *sukhāvaha* (leading, tending to *sukha*). And further down¹⁴⁾ he expressly antagonized natural posture and prescribed posture: *sāṃsiddhiko hi prayatnaḥ śarīradhārako na yogāṅgasyopadeśavyāsanasya kāraṇam. Tasya tatkāraṇatva upadeśavaiyarthyaṭsvarasata eva tatsiddheḥ. Tasmādupadeśavyasyāsanasyāyam asādhako virodhī ca svābhāvikaḥ prayatnaḥ. Tasya ca yādṛcchikāsanahetutayāsananiyamopahantṛtvāt. Tasmādupadiṣṭaniyamāsanamabhyasyatā svābhāvikaprayatnaśaithilyāya prayatna āstheyo nānyathopadiṣṭamāsanam sidhyatīti svābhāvikaprayatnaśaithilyamāśana siddhihetuḥ. Anante vā nāganāyake sthīrataraphaṇāsahasraavidhīrtaśīvaṃbharāmaṇḍale samāpannam cittaṃ āsanam nirvartayatīti* = The natural effort which is sustaining the body, will not create a posture which is to be taught by a *yogāṅga*. If that could be complied with in this manner it would be useless to teach it because it (i. e., the posture) would be brought about in a natural way. Hence a natural effort is inefficient and contrary to that *āsana* which is to be taught; for it is the cause of an arbitrary *āsana* and thereby it destroys also the prescribed *āsana*. Therefore whoever wishes to acquire the prescribed and expounded *āsana* must develop an effort towards relaxation of the natural effort, since otherwise it is not possible to acquire the expounded *āsana*. The insignificance of the natural effort is the cause of acquiring *āsana*. On account of just that, *āsana* is brought about through an balanced state (*samāpatti*) of citta to Ananta (the ruler of serpents, who carries the globe on a thousand very firm hoods).

V ā c a s p a t i thus builds the contradistinction of the natural posture against the Yoga posture, whose feature is *sthīrasukha*. How this posture is to be taught, how it is to be practised, gives P a t a ṅ j a l i:¹⁵⁾ *prayatna-śaithilya-ananta-samāpattibhyām* = by relaxation of effort or by a (mental) state-of-balance with reference to Ananta (a posture results).

¹¹⁾ See Vācaspati Miśra to II, 46. This is also confirmed by the Haṭhayoga, I, 43: Other postures are of no use, when success has been achieved in *siddhāsana*, which, according to I, 36, is "very pleasant" (*sukha*).

¹²⁾ To II, 46.

¹³⁾ To II, 46.

¹⁴⁾ To II, 47.

¹⁵⁾ In II, 47.

The purpose of *āsana* is to prepare the body for further practices, especially *prāṇāyāma*. It entails mastering a certain posture and making the body cease to be an obstacle for concentration, freeing it from all *antarāyas*¹⁶⁾ that are a cause of *duḥkha*. So in the *āsana* practice that sort of procedure should be made use of, by which the antithesis to *sthira* and *sukha* would be removed and the ground for further concentration would be prepared.

All the commentators actually stress this counteracting effort bound to remove the obstacles. Thus *Vyāsa*¹⁷⁾ says that *yena na aṅgamejaya bhavati* = (in consequence of the *āsana* practice) the trembling of the body ceases to come on. Similarly *Bhoja*: *asmiṃścāsana-jaye sati samādhyantarāyabhūtā na prabhavantyaṅgamejayatvādayaḥ* = when this command over the posture has been attained, the tremblings, & c., which are obstacles to meditation, no longer prevail.¹⁸⁾

The same is affirmed in the *Hāṭhayoga*:¹⁹⁾ *kuryāttadāsanam sthairyam ārogyam cāṅgalāghavam* = it should be practised for gaining steady posture, health and lightness of body. Speaking of many *āsanas* it says that they are destroyers of diseases = *vyādhivināśanam*;²⁰⁾ others cleanse the impurities of *nāḍīs* = *nāḍīnām malaśodhanam*,²¹⁾ and recommends practice, for *kriyaiva kāraṇam siddheḥ*²²⁾ = practice alone is the means to success.

Already in the chapter dealing with *yamas* and *niyamas* we pointed out that as the result of the *pratipakṣabhāvana* practice, *sthairya* (confirmation) is attained;²³⁾ with the *āsana* practice this same result is attained by constancy of effort. It is appropriate to recall what is said in the *Hāṭhayoga*:²⁴⁾ *Kriyāyuktasya siddhiḥ syād akriyasya katham bhavet. Na śāstrapāthamātreṇa yogasiddhiḥ prajāyate* = Success comes to him who is engaged in the practice. How can one get success without practice? For by merely reading books on Yoga one can never get success.

With the *āsana* practice, also another remark of the *Hāṭhayoga* can be connected relating to the practice in the *Yoga-sūtras*²⁵⁾ and throwing more light on the *āsana* practice:²⁶⁾ *Deśakālau ca samkīrtiya samkalpya vidhipūrvakam. Adyetyādi śrīparamēśvaraprasādapūrvakam samādhi tat-*

¹⁶⁾ Given in I, 31, such as *vyādhi* — disease, *aṅgamejayatva* — trembling, etc.

¹⁷⁾ To II, 47.

¹⁸⁾ See also I, 31.

¹⁹⁾ I, 19.

²⁰⁾ E. g., I, 46, 56, etc.

²¹⁾ I, 41.

²²⁾ I, 68.

²³⁾ I, 39.

²⁴⁾ I, 67.

²⁵⁾ II, 47.

²⁶⁾ *Hāṭhayogapradīpika*, transl. by Pancham Sinh, 1915, p. 21; II, 50, 4, 5.

phala siddhyartham āsanapūrvakān prāṇāyāmādīn kariṣye. Anantaṁ prameḍdevam nāgeśam pīṭhasiddhaye. Maṇibhrātphaṇāsahasravighṛtaviśvambharāmaṇḍalāyātamtāya nāgarājāyanamaḥ. Tatobhyased āsanāniśrame jāte śavāsanaṁ. Ante samabhyasetattu śramābhāve tu nābhyaset = Having extolled the place and the time and taking up the vow thus, "Today by the grace of God, I will perform *prāṇāyāma* with *āsana* for gaining *samādhi* and its fruits"; he should salute the infinite Lord of the Nāga, to ensure success in the *āsana*. "Salutation to the Lord of the Nāga, who is adorned with thousands of heads, set with brilliant jewels (*maṇiḥ*) and who has sustained the whole universe, nourishes it and is infinite." After this he should begin his exercise of *āsanas* and when fatigued, he should practise *śavāsana*. Should there be no fatigue, he should not practise it.

Let us emphasize here that the *āsana* practices should be performed with certain effort, exertion, which should be followed by relaxation, since the purpose of *śavāsana* is to chase away the fatigue resulting from exertion, as explained in the Haṭhayoga:²⁷⁾ *Uttānaṁ śavavadbhūmau śayanaṁ tacchvāsanaṁ śavāsanaṁ śrēṇṭiharaṁ cittaviśrāṁtikāraṇam* = lying down on the ground like a corpse is called *śavāsana*; it removes fatigue and gives rest to the mind.

This, too, confirms Vācaspati's explanation of *āsana*. Bhoja²⁸⁾ characterizes the plan of the *āsana* practice so, that through its result *sukha* is bound to be attained and *duḥkha* to be removed, hence without *kleśas*: *Yadā yadāsanam badhnāmīti icchāṁ karoti prayatnaśaithilye 'pyakleśenaiva tadā tadāsanam niṣpadyate. Yadā ākāśagate ānantye cetasaḥ samāpattiḥ kriyate avadhānena tadātmyamāpadyate tadā dehāhaṁkārahā-vānnāsanam duḥkhaṇakam bhavati* = When he forms the wish: Let me establish myself in such and such a posture, — that posture is effected with slight effort, without trouble, and when the mind attains the boundlessness that belongs to space — i. e., when in thought one has identified one's self with it — then, from there being neither body nor selfconsciousness, the posture is no cause of pain (*duḥkha*).

It follows from all this that during the practice of *āsana*, which is antithetical to the natural posture, the antithesis must be balanced out by an effort, exertion, then by relaxation, and all the time the citta (mind) is fixed on the contemplation of Ananta (the Indefinite).²⁹⁾ It means that in the *āsana* practice the energetical element (*sthira*) is combined with the emotive (*sukha*) and intellectual (*anantasamāpatti*) one. Hence *prayatna* represents the energetical element and *śaithilya* the emotive one. The energetical element intensifies the effort for the unflinch-

²⁷⁾ I, 34.

²⁸⁾ To II, 47.

²⁹⁾ Or (according to Vācaspati and the Haṭhayoga) of the earth-bearing king of serpents, named Ananta.

ingness of *āsana*, while the emotive element is growing calmer until it passes from *duḥkha* into *sukha*; at this stage is fulfilled the assumption that *citta* is capable of concentration which is needed particularly to achieve *pratyāhāra*.

In this explanation we are borne out by Visuddhimagga:³⁰⁾ ... the Blessed One, in setting forth a way of deportment which is calm and does not partake of slackness or of distraction, said, "He sits down". And then, to show that he has sat down in a firm position, that he is feeling the bliss derived from the breathing in and out and that there is a way to seize the object, the Blessed One said, bending the legs crosswise, ... (etc.) For the skin, flesh, and the sinews of a man who sits thus, are not bent. And he does not feel those sensations which arise every moment from their being bent. Those sensations not arising, the mind becomes collected, the subject of meditation is not dropped, but achieves growth and development.

According to Lindquist,³¹⁾ there are two ways of explaining II, 47: (a) *āsana* is attained as a result of practice, so that we succeed in achieving even the most difficult posture without effort, or (b) the posture is immaterial, whether it may be troublesome or not; what matters is that all muscles are relaxed, yet the posture must be firm (*sthira*). In case, however, of the first possibility being valid, *abhyāsa* would have to be cited as a compulsory condition. He arrives at the conclusion, that the main feature of *āsana* is precisely *śaithilya*. It must here be borne in mind, of course, that *abhyāsa* is of necessity characterized by *yatna* (effort). *Āsana* has to be practised, and an enormous amount of *prayatna* is needed to overcome all difficulties, slacken all impediments (according to the commentaries: *akleśa, na aṅgamejayah, na duḥkhaśāntakam*). If Lindquist in his subsequent deduction³²⁾ brings the equation: *āsana* = the firm posture + *śaithilya* + *anantasamāpatti*, then this equation becomes complete if for the firm posture we substitute *prayatna*, i. e., the effort to attain this posture, since the firm posture is precisely *āsana*. By this substitution we are actually able to reiterate all the features of *āsana*, as cited by nobody other than Patañjali himself.³³⁾ Even Vyāsa's explanation of *yathāsukha* is now comprehensible to us, for the point is not that it is immaterial whether a posture is tiresome or not, but it is immaterial which posture we are practising, provided, of course, that the cited members of the equation are being complied with.

On the other hand, nevertheless, Lindquist himself³⁴⁾ recalls

³⁰⁾ The Path of Purity, II, p. 310, § 271.

³¹⁾ L. c., p. 34.

³²⁾ L. c., p. 36.

³³⁾ In II, 47.

³⁴⁾ L. c., p. 35.

correctly (although he bases it on the interpretation of *śaithilya* alone instead of *āsana* in general) that *āsana* is not merely a certain attitude of the body but “ein veränderter Bewußtseinszustand”, a changed state of the consciousness, as referred to in II, 48: *tato dvamdvānabhighātaḥ* = thence there is no harassment by the pairs. This bears out also our analysis of *yama* and *niyama*, that by constant quantitative accumulation the quality becomes changed; in this case, i. e. that of *āsana*, by assiduous practice a (qualitatively) different state of the consciousness, *siddhi*, is attained.

Hence the analysis of *āsana*, too, shows that like in the case of *yama* and *niyama*, here also an “*aśuddhi kṣaye*” is involved — a removal of antithetical obstacles by an intensification of the effort in order to attain the emotive reversal from *duḥkha* to *sukha* and make the knowledge ever clearer (*jñāna dīptir*...). By assiduous and repeated practice, or by quantitative accumulation, the quality becomes changed.

It is out of connection with our present task to analyze *āsana* and its problematics in the *sūtras* further; it is unnecessary to compare exercises conducive to the removal of *aṅgamejayatvam*,³⁵⁾ or cite other qualitative changes,³⁶⁾ and so forth, for on the methodical side we have found the same degree of congruity of practice with the first three *aṅgas*, inasmuch as they observe the same methodical principle for reaching the aims of Yoga.

To make the analysis complete, however, we must discuss yet other factors of the *bahiraṅgas*, that is *prāṇāyāma* and *pratyāhāra*, to see if they adhere to the same methodical principle as we have already ascertained in *yama*, *niyama* and *āsana*.

P r ā ṇ ā y ā m a.

We may readily predict, with a fair degree of certainty, that the fourth *aṅga*, *prāṇāyāma*, should abide by the above-mentioned methodical principle in such a way that regulated breathing would be antithetical to normal breathing, just as in the case of *āsana* controlled posture of the body stood against the natural posture, and *yamas* and *niyamas* regulated our conduct both in social and inner relations. *Prāṇāyāma* is focused functionally on attaining the aims of Yoga by removing impurities in order to comply with the requirement — *aśuddhikṣaye jñānadīptir ā vivekakhyāteḥ*.

Breath-regulation is discussed by P a t a ṅ j a l i on two places, viz., I, 31, 34, and II, 49—53. He builds an antithesis between *śvāsa-praśvāsa*,¹⁾ characterized by the phrase *cittavikṣepasahabhuva* — inbreathing and

³⁵⁾ II, 31 sqq.

³⁶⁾ III, 24, 29, 30, 46.

¹⁾ I, 31 and 34.

outbreathing are the companions of distraction of *citta* — and *pracchar-dana vidhāraṇābhyām vā prāṇasya*, by which *cittaprasādana* is attained — expulsion or retention of breath, that bring about steadiness of the *citta*; notwithstanding the fact that Patañjali cites here also other methods.²⁾

In II, 49 he defines *prāṇāyāma* as *śvāsapraśvāsayorgativiccheda* — cutting short of the motion of inbreathing and outbreathing. *Viccheda* may be made to correspond with *vidhāraṇa*, as identified also by Vyāsa:³⁾ *vidhāraṇam prāṇāyāmaḥ*, which forms also the substance of this *aṅga*. The purpose in the two cited places is likewise the same, for *cittaprasādana* corresponds in II, 53 to *dhāraṇāsu योग्यता मनसाḥ* — the fitness of the mind for concentration.⁴⁾

Normal breathing, in-breathing and out-breathing, without any conscious effort on the part of the person, is hence distinct from, and obstacle to, *prāṇāyāma*, which is among the means of *samādhi*, as Vācaspati⁵⁾ says — *samādhyāṅgavirodhī* = (opposed to it).

Breath in Yoga is a measure of both mental and physical life. Irregular breathing is a companion of disease and other complaints,⁶⁾ mental depression likewise is accompanied by irregular breathing, which may take up different forms according to its length, duration and number,⁷⁾ and therefore is *dīrghasūkṣma* — long or short. The form of respiration is either outward-inward (exhalation, inhalation),⁸⁾ or suspended,⁹⁾ when it rests motionless like water in a jar;¹⁰⁾ just as a drop of water placed on a heated stone-slab becomes shrivelled from all sides, in the same manner there is absence of both (in- and out-breathing) at one and the same time.¹¹⁾ This concealed or suspended breath can be attained by a single effort,¹²⁾ and is qualified by place, time and number — is long and short.

The purpose of *prāṇāyāma*, however, is gradual overcoming even of this stage of breathing by intensified effort, by gradual restraining the

²⁾ I, 32—39.

³⁾ To I, 34.

⁴⁾ The antithesis is referred to also in the *Hatthayoga*, II, 2: *cale vāte calaṁ cittaṁ niścale niścalaṁ bhavet, yogī sthāṇutvamāpnoti tato vāyūm nirodhayet* — respiration being disturbed, the mind becomes disturbed. By restraining (*nirodha*) respiration, the yogī gains steadiness of mind.

⁵⁾ To I, 31.

⁶⁾ I, 30, 31: *antarāyāḥ*.

⁷⁾ II, 50: *deśakālasaṁkhyābhiḥ paridrṣṭaḥ*—regulated by space, time and number.

⁸⁾ II, 51: *bāhyābhyantaraviśayaḥ*.

⁹⁾ *Stambhavṛttiḥ* — stationary function, steady.

¹⁰⁾ Bhoja to II, 50: *jalamiva kumbhe niścalaḥ*.

¹¹⁾ Vyāsa to II, 50: *yathā tapte nyastamupale jalam sarvataḥ saṁkocamāpadyate tathā dvayoryugapadgatya bhāva iti*.

¹²⁾ Vyāsa to II, 50: *sakṛtprayatnādbhavati*.

out- and in-breathing,¹³⁾ until both of them are completely discontinued, discarded¹⁴⁾ suddenly, like a lotus dropped upon a heated stone at once arrives at the condition of rigidity,¹⁵⁾ so that the rhythm of the respiration has completely ceased.¹⁶⁾ And it is just this fourth, neutral, respirative process that is the aim of *prāṇāyāma*, when neither in-breathing nor out-breathing is taking place; sometimes it is denoted by the words *caturtha* (the fourth),¹⁷⁾ *śūnyaka* and *kevalakumbhaka*,¹⁸⁾ or *nīrodha* (restraint).¹⁹⁾

Appropriate is also the characteristic of this state in the Haṭha-yoga:²⁰⁾ *Yāvadvāyuh sthito dehe tāvajjīvanamucyate, maraṇam tasya niṣkrāntistato vāyuh nirodhayet* = So long as the air stays in the body, it is called life. Death consists in the passing out of the air. It is, therefore, necessary to restrain the breath.

*Vijñāna Bhikṣu*²¹⁾ points out that this fourth stage of respiration is achieved after long practice and that exceptional *siddhis* are acquired as the reward of its complete mastery: *Evamabhyāsakrameṇa yadā deśakālasamkhyābhir aparicchedyau recakapūrakau vinaiva māsa-saṃvatsarādīsthāyī bahudeśasthāyī kumbhako bhavati sa kevalakumbhaka-ścaturthaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ. Tasmin sati ākāśagamānādi siddhayo jīyante* = When in due course of exercise this *kumbhaka*, lasting for months and years together and in many places, subsists without the *recaka* (expelling, exhalation) and the *pūraka* (filling, inhalation), not specialized by either place, time, or number, then that *kumbhaka* is called *kevalakumbhaka* (self-existent, absolute), the fourth form of *prāṇāyāma*. The powers of moving about in the sky etc. follow this (form of *prāṇāyāma*).

Both *Bhoja*'s and *Vyāsa*'s explanations²²⁾ of *bāhyābhyantara-viṣayākṣepī caturthaḥ* are congruent. The *prāṇāyāma* practice is hence expressed by the words *viccheda*²³⁾ and *ākṣepa*.²⁴⁾ *Kevalakumbhaka* is the resultant state, and in this sense the explanation given by *Lindquist*²⁵⁾ must be adjusted.

The energetical constituent, like in the case of *āsana*, is represented

¹³⁾ Vyāsa to II, 51: *śvāsapraśvāsayorviṣayāvadhāraṇātkrameṇa bhūmi jayāt.*

¹⁴⁾ *Ubhayākṣepapūrvakaḥ.*

¹⁵⁾ *Bhoja* to II, 51: *sahasā taptopalanīpatitajalajanyāyena yugapat stambhavṛttiyā niṣpadyate.*

¹⁶⁾ Vyāsa to II, 51: *gatyabhāvaḥ.*

¹⁷⁾ II, 51.

¹⁸⁾ In the commentaries; *Vijñāna Bhikṣu*, p. 40. Haṭhayoga II, 72, 73.

¹⁹⁾ *Bhoja* to II, 51.

²⁰⁾ II, 3.

²¹⁾ *Yogasārasaṃgraha*, p. 41.

²²⁾ To II, 51.

²³⁾ II, 49.

²⁴⁾ II, 51; *ā + kṣip* = thrown down, overcome, cut short.

²⁵⁾ L. c., p. 40.

by the intensified effort emphasized notably by V ā c a s p a t i²⁶⁾ — *pratyaham abhyastah* (by everyday practice), *kramena* (by degrees). The emotive constituent (negative) is gradually weakened while the intellectual one is unfolding:²⁷⁾ *tataḥ kṣīyate prakāśāvaraṇam* — then is destroyed that which hides the light. Bhoja²⁸⁾ adds that this *āvaraṇa* is *kleśarūpa* — the withholding from view takes the shape of afflictions; and Vyāsa²⁹⁾ ranges *prāṇāyāma* functionally with that stage of the practices which is conducive to removal of impurities and illumination of right knowledge (*viśuddhirmalānāṃ dīptiśca jñānasyeti*), for through the *prāṇāyāma* exercise the Karma, which hides the light, becomes attenuated and continues to be destroyed every moment (*tadasya prakāśāvaraṇam karma prāṇāyāmābhyāsād durbalam bhavati pratikṣaṇam ca kṣīyate*).

In the Haṭhayoga,³⁰⁾ too, the progress of the practice is emphasized: *prāṇāyāmam tataḥ kuryānnityam sātvikayā dhiyā yathā suṣumnā-nāḍīsthā malāḥ śuddhiṃ prayānti ca* = therefore *prāṇāyāma* should be performed daily with *sattvika* mind (i. e., free from *rajas* and *taṃas*), in order to drive out the impurities of *suṣumnā*.

The progress of the *prāṇāyāma* exercise is prescribed likewise in Visuddhimagga.³¹⁾ At the start conscious respiration, with an increased degree of attention, is practised, whereat the effort to conquer the distress of both the body and the mind grows more intense: And because in the initial method he need only breathe in and breathe out, not doing anything else, and henceforth should strive for the formation of knowledge, etc. . . .³²⁾ For, previous to the time of making the effort, the body and the mind of the monk are distressed and coarse. And when the coarseness of body and mind does not subside, the breathings, too, are gross, becoming very thick, so that the nostrils cannot hold them, and he has to breathe through the mouth also. But when his body and mind are taken in hand, then they are calm and quiet. As soon as they become calm, his breathings become finer, insomuch that he might ask, "Do they exist or do they not?"

The essence of the *prāṇāyāma* practice³³⁾ may hence be visualized so that breath-regulation affects not only the body but the mind also, reflecting, so to speak, backward, just as concentration on some matter can inversely have its effect on the adjustment of the respiration.³⁴⁾ This

²⁶⁾ To II, 50.

²⁷⁾ I, 52.

²⁸⁾ To II, 3.

²⁹⁾ Conforming to II, 28.

³⁰⁾ II, 6.

³¹⁾ § 271 sqq.

³²⁾ § 274 (Pt. II, p. 315).

³³⁾ I, 34 and II, 49 sqq.

³⁴⁾ I, 32.

is confirmed also by everyday experience which is being made use of by Yoga to work out a plan for a practice availing for the attainment of the goals of Yoga.

A subsidiary result of this practice in addition to that mentioned in II, 52 is also³⁵⁾ *dhārāṇāsu योग्याता मनसाह* — the fitness of the mind for concentration.

The two results (*phala*) represent another qualitative change brought about again by quantitative accumulation. Even Lindquist³⁶⁾ admits this change as (to quote his own words) “veränderter psychophysischer Zustand”, “die markante Veränderung des Bewußtztzustandes”, and comes to the conclusion that particularly in the case of *prāṇāyāma*, but probably also in that of *āsana*, these practices produce, in addition to the changed state of the consciousness, also characteristic phenomena of physiological nature — of which he speaks as being corresponding to catalepsy. He has, however, overlooked the functional aspect of both *āsana* and *prāṇāyāma*, if he thinks³⁷⁾ that *prāṇāyāma* as applied in Buddhism is of more spiritual character (“mehr geistig”).

It will suit our purpose to quote from Visuddhimagga³⁸⁾ what we are told there on the relation and results of *prāṇāyāma*: And this respiration, mindfulness, with its sixteen bases — is of much fruit and greatly beneficial, as can be seen from the statement, “Monks, this concentration on respiration-mindfulness, being developed and repeated, is peace-giving and exalted, etc.” (Samyutta V, 321). That it is greatly beneficial is to be understood by way of its tranquillity and also of its ability to cut off evil thoughts. For, owing to its tranquillity, exaltedness, unadulteratedness, happiness of life, this concentration destroys the wanderings here and there of the mind, due to harmful, evil thoughts, and brings it towards respiration as the object. Hence it is said: “Respiration-mindfulness is to be developed to the end that it may cut off evil thoughts.” (Anguttara IV, 353.)

We have demonstrated, therefore, that even in *prāṇāyāma* the same methodical principle is being applied as in *yamas*, *niyamas* and *āsana*. When antithetical obstacles are removed on stepping-up the effort and the practice, the intellectual element is unfolded, until a qualitative change of the state of the consciousness is achieved. This fully justifies our thesis that *yamas* and *niyamas* reveal an identity of methodical approaches in their respective practices, the latter being in principle the same as in the other *aṅgas*. And that is the same pattern as we shall be able to trace in the subsequent *aṅga* — *pratyāhāra*.

³⁵⁾ II, 53.

³⁶⁾ L. c., p. 40, 41, 46.

³⁷⁾ L. c., p. 55.

³⁸⁾ Chapter VIII, § 291 (II, p. 335).

Pratyāhāra.

The basis for *pratyāhāra* must again be sought in Patañjali's sūtras:¹⁾ *svaviṣayāsamprayoge cittasvarūpānukāra ivendriyāṇām pratyāhārah* (other texts give: *svasvaviṣayāsamprayogābhava cittasya svarūpānukāra ivendriyāṇām pratyāhārah*) = When the senses are no longer in contact with their objects, they come to resemble the (inhibited) mind and this constitutes abstention (or: restraint). The result (*phala*) is given in II, 55 thus: *tataḥ paramā vaśyatendriyāṇām* — thence the highest stage of the mastery of the senses.

According to Lindquist²⁾ the method for *pratyāhāra* is *ekāgratā* — singleness of attention. Lindquist gets his support for this in Vyāsa's and Vācaspati's interpretations.³⁾ From Patañjali, however, a different methodical approach is evident, whose ultimate goal is *ekāgratā*. The two constituents of *pratyāhāra* are (1) *asamprayoga*, otherwise *samprayogābhava* (absence of contact) and (2) *anukāra* — resemblance, imitation, accommodation (of the senses to the nature of the mind). Both these constituents represent also the methodical approach to the *pratyāhāra* practice.

To begin with, an antithetical sensual process is involved. The antithesis is between the *samprayoga* and *asamprayoga* of the senses. Vyāsa⁴⁾ offers the explanation of these antitheses. He describes *samprayoga* as *vyasana* = *saktiḥ* = attachment to sound and the other sense-objects, which alienates (*vyasyati*) the man from his welfare (*śreyasa iti*). It is *viruddhā pratipattiḥ* = contrary perception (to the reason — *nyāyā*), it is not in harmony with one's own desire (*svecchayā*), it brings pleasure or pain (*sukha-duḥkha*) and is accompanied by attachment and aversion (*rāga-dveṣa*). The progress of *pratyāhāra*, then, is from *samprayoga* to *asamprayoga* and across *cittasvarūpānukāra* ultimately to *paramā vaśyatendriyāṇām*.

The simplest method, "liked also by the ignorant" (*mūḍhānāmapī sammatam*), is given by the Haṭhayoga:⁵⁾ The ears, the eyes, the nose and the mouth should be closed, the yogī should hear the sound inside his right ear, with collected mind (*ekadhīḥ*). By closing off the senses, *asamprayoga* is achieved. Now the connection of the *citta* with this sound ensues.⁶⁾ By listening to the sound the *citta* settles down in peace,⁷⁾ has

¹⁾ II, 54.

²⁾ L. c., p. 60.

³⁾ To II, 55.

⁴⁾ To II, 55.

⁵⁾ IV, 64 sqq.

⁶⁾ IV, 76.

⁷⁾ IV, 81.

no interest for other things,⁸⁾ just as a bee drinking sweet juice does not care for the smell of the flower. And when the senses cease to be in contact with their objects, they accommodate themselves to the nature of the mind, for all senses are observed to follow obsequiously the mind, as the bees their leader — say the commentators in keeping with one another. So the senses become inhibited when the mind is inhibited. This total absence of sense-experience, on account of the concentration of the mind (*cittailcāgryāt*), is the highest stage of the subjugation of the senses. And just this is the point where Lindquist aptly remarks⁹⁾ that this stage seems to denote the changed state of the consciousness.

Thus even in this *aṅga* there are included all the elements of the methodical progress from an antithesis through intensification of the practice to ultimate change of quality. Let this suffice without entering upon further details and making comparisons with other sūtras that speak about *pratyāhāra*.

This also terminates the task of the *bahiraṅgas* directed upon the removal of impurities (*aśuddhikṣaye*) from action, bodily attitudes, forms of respiration, and the senses, as well as the attainment of a control over all these up to their complete subjugation, in order to facilitate the further progress in the concentration exercises prior to *nirbīja samādhi*.

In each of the discussed Yoga practices we have discovered the same methodical principle, so that we may proceed to summarizing the results of our analysis in a final review.

C o n c l u s i o n .

P a t a ṅ j a l i takes the man the way he really is, with all his possibilities of contraventions, sins, sorrows, and ignorance (*vitarkas*, *antarāyas*, *kleśas*). He has strung human life in the way of a bi-polar vertical at whose nether end there is undiscriminated knowledge (*ajñāna*, *avidyā*), resulting in infinite sorrow (*duḥkha*), whilst at its upper end exists the state of discriminated knowledge (*viveka-khyātiḥ*), with the ultimate goal — *kaivalya*. Somewhere along this vertical belongs man — *puruṣa*, the number of those who are encumbered by an action and its consequences, with the place at the top taken by the most elevated *puruṣa* — *Īśvara*, who was never affected by anything like that. This bi-polarity of the antithesis is a presupposition of the Yoga pattern in that sense that the man enters upon it by becoming aware of the undiscriminated state of knowledge through analysis, i. e. through a dialectical process; that he places both these states into an antithesis. By constant comparison he produces a directional reversal of his action, so that he does not tend for evil any

⁸⁾ IV, 89.

⁹⁾ L. c., p. 59.

more; hence he obviates evil, puts out of his way all the obstacles to his own inner growth, in clarifying his knowledge, sorting out the cognitive elements, and intensifying his inner growth to perfection up to the moment when the discriminated knowledge becomes fully unfolded and the goal is attained. The signs of a correct progress are the *siddhis* (perfections).

The methodical approach now consists in one's taking up the right attitude following a dialectical antithesis — *pratipakṣa*, and causing a reversal of the directional tendency; by stepping-up the intensity (*bhāvana*) one brings about a change in quality which, by way of back-reflection, also affects action, body, respiration, as well as the senses, encouraging a further growth.

This methodical approach is made manifest principally in the *bahir-aṅgas*. Every man undergoes the process of purification in the course of his contacts with his environment, with other people. Some commentators curtailed this process saying that it had already been undergone in preceding lives.

Yama and *niyama*, together with *kriyāyoga* as well as *īśvara-praṇidhāna*, are notable by sharing an identical methodical approach which is the same as that in the other *aṅgas*; hence they are an organic part of the Yoga pattern. They even ordain the only relevant and suitable practice — *pratipakṣabhāvana*, inducing a reversal of the directional tendency from *duḥkha*, *ajñāna*, with a view to the gradual discernment of knowledge. By an intensification of the practice, its quantitative accumulation, a change of quality and certain perfections (*siddhis*) are achieved just as in the case of the other *aṅgas*.

This shows unmistakably that *yama* and *niyama* are practices of Yoga, and that the *siddhis*, far from being attained automatically, may only come about as a result of constant intensification of the practices, like in the case of the other *aṅgas*.